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We consider the eects of central-bank purchases of a risky asset, nanced
by issuing riskless nominal liabilities (reserves), as an additional dimension of
policy alongside \conventional" monetary policy (central-bank control of the
riskless nominal interest rate), in a general-equilibrium model of asset pricing
and risk sharing with endogenous collateral constraints of the kind proposed by
Geanakoplos (1997). When sucient collateral exists for collateral constraints
not to bind for any agents, we show that central-bank asset purchases have no
eects on either real or nominal variables, despite the diering risk character-
istics of the assets purchased and the ones issued to nance these purchases.
At the same time, the existence of collateral constraints allows our model to
capture the common view that large enough central-bank purchases would even-
tually have to eect asset prices. But even when central-bank purchases raise
the price of the asset, owing to binding collateral constraints, the eects need
not be the ones commonly assumed. We show that under some circumstances,
central-bank purchases relax nancial constraints, increase aggregate demand,
and may even achieve a Pareto improvement; but in other cases, they may
tighten nancial constraints, reduce aggregate demand, and lower welfare. The
latter case is almost certainly the one that arises if central-bank purchases are
suciently large.
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los, Steve Williamson, and participants at presentations at IMPA, MIT, the Cowles Foundation
Conference on General Equilibrium and its Applications, and the Annual Fall Conference of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for helpful comments. We also acknowledge nancial support
from CAPES-PNPD and IMPA (Schommer), and the NSF under grant SES-0820438 (Woodford).
One of the more notable developments in central banking since the global nancial
crisis has been an increase in the diversity of types of market transactions through
which central banks have sought to inuence nancial conditions. Before the crisis,
it had become common to think of monetary policy as a uni-dimensional decision:
the periodic reconsideration of the central bank's operating target for a single, short-
term (typically overnight) nominal interest rate. Over the past ve years, instead, a
number of leading central banks (including the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan,
and the Bank of England) have made almost no changes in their policy rates | having
taken those rates to levels viewed as their eective lower bounds by the beginning
of 2009, while additional monetary easing continued to be desired | yet have been
quite active on other dimensions, making dramatic changes in both the size and
composition of their balance sheets.
While the theoretical literature on the eects of changes in interest-rate policy,
and on the way in which variations in the supply of bank reserves and adjustment of
the rate of interest paid on reserves allow central banks eective control of short-term
interest rates, is well-developed, much less is understood about the eects that should
follow from variations in the central bank's balance sheet apart from those involved
in implementing interest-rate policy. On one traditional view, the assets held by the
central bank to \back" its issuance of monetary liabilities are of little macroeconomic
signicance | only the quantity of reserves created should matter, and that only
because of its implications for the determination of short-term interest rates. There
would then be little reason to conceive of multi-dimensional monetary policy options.
On an alternative view, the asset-purchase programs recently implemented by central
banks are simply a variant of what monetary policy has always been about: central
banks exchanging one type of nancial instrument for another, so as to inuence
market rates of return. On this view, there are naturally multiple possible dimensions
of policy to the extent that there are multiple interest rates | as there naturally are,
given the dierent risk characteristics of dierent instruments.
Here we undertake a theoretical analysis of the eects of alternative dimensions of
monetary policy, in a general-equilibrium asset-pricing framework in which assets with
dierent risk characteristics co-exist and earn dierent rates of return in equilibrium.
We introduce a central bank with eective control over short-term nominal interest
rates, that can determine the general level of prices (of goods and services in terms of
money) through this \conventional" monetary policy; but we also allow the central to
engage in open-market purchases and sales of the various types of assets with diering
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risk characteristics that are traded in the marketplace, and consider the extent to
which allowing for variations in the size and composition of the balance sheet, holding
interest-rate policy xed, provide useful additional dimensions of policy.
It is important to note that we do not here seek to model central-bank credit poli-
cies: lending by a central bank to specic types of borrowers at below-market rates,
either because it wishes to subsidize certain activities or institutions, or because pri-
vate intermediation has become highly inecient, as during the most severe phase of
the recent nancial crisis.1 (There is little mystery about the fact that such policies
should aect the allocation of resources and that they are not equivalent to conven-
tional interest-rate policy in their eects | and we shall not discuss them here.) The
policies with which we are concerned, such as the Fed's asset-purchase programs since
the fall of 2010, involve open-market purchases of assets that are traded on highly
liquid markets, and are aimed at achieving macroeconomic goals by inuencing nan-
cial conditions for the economy as a whole, rather than at providing credit for specic
borrowers or categories of borrowers. Our model is therefore one in which nancial
markets are ecient, in the sense that all traders are able to purchase the same set
of assets, at prices that are independent of the identity of the purchaser and of the
quantity purchased, and that the spread between the price paid by a buyer and that
received by the seller of assets is assumed to be negligible; and all central-bank trades
are assumed to occur at these well-dened market prices.2
There is, however, one important respect in which we shall assume that nancial
markets are not frictionless in the sense of Arrow and Debreu, and this is important
for the consequences of \unconventional" monetary policy: we shall assume, as in
Geanakoplos (1997) and Araujo et al. (2002), that all privately issued nancial claims
1Many of the novel policies introduced by the Federal Reserve during the acute phase of the
global nancial crisis were of this kind; Bernanke (2009) characterized the Fed's policies during this
period as \credit easing," to distinguish them from the \quantitative easing" of the Bank of Japan
during the period 2001-2006 (which instead mainly involved open-market purchases of highly liquid
securities, mostly Japanese government bonds). The Fed's more recent asset-purchase programs can
less obviously be characterized in this way.
2Models such as those of Curdia and Woodford (2010) or Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013) instead
consider central-bank purchases of assets that many investors cannot directly purchase themselves,
because only certain specialized intermediaries (with limited capital and constraints on their access
to nancing) have the expertise required to evaluate them. These are more obviously appropriate as
models of programs such as the Fed's \credit easing" policies during the acute phase of the nancial
crisis, rather than its more recent asset-purchase programs.
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(as opposed to physical assets or government liabilities) must be collateralized. While
the collateral requirements in our model represent a friction, in the sense that some
mutually benecial trades are precluded, we believe that this assumption is not only
realistic, but a characteristic of the markets that are most ecient in the senses
referred to above, since insistence on collateral of a standardized type is precisely an
institution that makes it possible for transacting parties to be much less concerned
with the identity of the parties with which they trade and the other trades of those
parties.3
Moreover, rather than assuming collateral requirements (and hence borrowing
limits) of an arbitrary form, we endogenize the collateral requirements, as in the
models of Geanakoplos (1997) and Geanakoplos and Zame (2013).4 This approach
allows markets potentially to exist for both more and less well-collateralized private
debts, with both the questions of what interest rate is required in the case of a given
degree of collateral and which types of partially-collateralized debt will actually be
issued being determined through competition in the marketplace.
Our main conclusions can briey be summarized. We nd that pure changes
in the central bank's balance sheet, in the absence of any change in the short-term
nominal interest rate, can aect asset prices, the allocation of resources and the
general level of prices; hence they do constitute a potentially useful independent
dimension of policy. However, these eects depend critically upon the way in which
and degree to which collateral constraints bind in equilibrium; hence the allowance
for collateral constraints is crucial to our results. We show that when collateral is
suciently abundant for no households' collateral constraints to bind, central-bank
asset purchases are irrelevant, aecting neither the equilibrium prices of nancial
assets nor the money prices of goods and services nor the allocation of resources.
And even when collateral constraints bind, the eects of asset purchases depend
critically on the particular way in which they bind; for example, we show that central-
3Sharp increases in collateral requirements were a notable feature of the recent nancial crisis (as
discussed, for example, by Adrian and Shin, 2010; Brunnermeier, 2009; and Gorton and Metrick,
2012). This makes it of particular interest to ask how collateral constraints matter for the eects of
both conventional and unconventional monetary policies.
4Araujo et al. (2000, 2005) instead propose an alternative approach to the endogenization of
collateral requirements, in which the collateral requirement is set by the lender, rather than being
market-determined. We leave for future work the extent to which our conclusions may depend on
the method used to determine the endogenous collateral constraints.
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bank purchases of the risky good used as collateral will loosen private borrowers'
collateral constraints under some circumstances, but tighten them under others. The
conditions that determine which will be the case are somewhat complex; but one
quite general observation is that acquisition of a suciently large fraction of the total
supply of the collateral good by the central bank makes it almost inevitable that
the collateral constraints of a non-trivial part of the population will be tightened by
the central bank's policy. There are, however, conditions under which central-bank
asset purchases will improve the situation of all parties, and thus achieve a Pareto
improvement relative to an inecient initial status quo; we oer both analytical
sucient conditions for this to be the case and a numerical illustration.
Finally, we consider the extent to which asset-purchase policies are properly con-
sidered to be nearly equivalent to interest-rate policy, in the sense that asset purchases
can achieve similar macroeconomic eects as an interest-rate reduction, though with-
out requiring any change in the short-term nominal interest rate. Such an equivalence
would suggest that asset purchases are appropriate when further interest-rate cuts
are precluded by the zero lower bound, but perhaps unnecessary under other cir-
cumstances. It would also suggest that standard guidelines for interest-rate policy,
such as the Taylor Rule, should have direct implications for an appropriate use of
asset-purchase policy, once the correct equivalence scale between asset purchases and
interest-rate changes has been worked out.
In fact, we nd that while asset purchases can, under at least some circumstances,
achieve certain eects (such as raising the general level of prices) that might be the
goal of an interest-rate cut, this does not mean that they achieve this eect in the
same way | and with the same collateral eects on other variables | as an interest-
rate cut would. Indeed, under circumstances where conventional interest-rate policy
would aect the price level with no eects on any real variables, asset purchases
will instead, if able to aect the price level, do so only by also aecting the severity
of nancial distortions and hence the real allocation of resources. Asset-purchase
policies, when eective, are thus best viewed as a relatively orthogonal dimension of
policy to conventional interest-rate policy | and hence potentially useful even when
interest rates are not at the zero lower bound.
We introduce conventional monetary policy (i.e., interest-rate policy) into the
model of collateral-constrained equilibrium proposed by Geanakoplos and Zame (2013)
and Araujo et al. (2012) in section 1, and show that in our model conventional mon-
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etary policy has relatively standard eects. We then turn in section 2 to the eects
of central-bank asset purchases. We rst establish an irrelevance proposition for the
case when collateral is suciently abundant, but then discuss why the same argu-
ment will not continue to be valid when the collateral constraint binds for at least
some households. We further distinguish between two dierent ways in which the
collateral requirement may constrain a household's decisions, and the dierent eects
of asset-purchase policies upon the household's situation in these two cases.
The general-equilibrium eects of asset purchases on nancial and macroeconomic
equilibrium when collateral constraints bind are then developed in more detail in sec-
tion 3, focusing on a case of particular interest, in which the collateral requirement
limits the degree to which \natural buyers" of the risky asset are able to leverage
themselves to take a longer position in this asset. Section 4 explores a broader
variety of ways in which collateral constraints may bind, depending on the dier-
ent endowment patterns (and corresponding risk exposures) of dierently situated
households, through a series of numerical examples; it especially highlights the char-
acteristic distortions that result when too large a fraction of the supply of the asset
used as collateral comes to be held by the central bank. Section 5 summarizes our
conclusions.
1 A Monetary Model with Endogenous Collateral
Constraints
Here we present a nite-horizon general-equilibrium model with endogenous collat-
eral constraints, along the lines of Geanakoplos and Zame (2013) and Araujo et al.
(2012), but with a nominal unit of account, the value of which is determined by
conventional monetary policy, and a central bank that is not subject to the same
collateral constraint as private actors. We use the model to examine the eects of
two independent dimensions of monetary policy, interest-rate policy (\conventional
monetary policy") and central-bank asset purchases (\unconventional policy").5
5The model can also be used to show the eects of \forward guidance," a further dimension
of policy that has also been used more extensively when conventional policy is constrained by the
interest-rate lower bound. Our primary interest in this paper, however, is in interest-rate policy and
central-bank asset purchases.
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We consider a pure exchange economy over two time periods t = 0; 1; with un-
certainty about the state of nature in period 1 denoted by the subscript s 2 S =
f1; : : : ; Sg. The economy consists of a nite number of households denoted by the
superscript h 2 H = f1; : : : Hg which can each consume two goods or commodities
each period. One good is a non-durable consumer good, while the other is a durable
good, which yields a service ow in both periods; the service ow from the durable
(which might be thought of as housing) is not perfectly substitutable with non-durable
consumption, and is possibly risky in period 1. The importance of the durable good
in our model is as the only acceptable collateral in private loan contracts, discussed
below; hence the supply of durables will be an important determinant of the scarcity
of collateral.6
Because the durable good is assumed to be the only possible form of collateral, it
is possible that the households that choose to hold the durable at the end of period
0 will dier from those that choose to consume the services of the durable in period
0. We therefore assume the existence of a market for \rental" of the durable (i.e.,
consumption of its service ow) in addition to purchases of it as an asset to hold until
the next period.7
There are then eectively three goods each period | the non-durable good (good
1), the service ow from the durable (good 2), and the durable good itself, held as
an asset (good 3) | though utility is obtained from the consumption of only the
rst two of these goods. Each household has an initial endowment eh1  0 of the
6In practice, housing is an important form of collateral. However, collateral need not be a real
asset; a longer-term nominal asset might serve as collateral for a shorter-term loan contract, as in
the US Treasury repo market. It is important, however, to treat the case in which collateral has a
risky market value in period 1; and in our two-period model, such risk is most naturally introduced
by supposing that the asset used as collateral is a risky real asset, rather than a riskless nominal
government liability. Most of our conclusions about central-bank purchases of the risky durable
good would apply equally to central-bank purchases of longer-term nominal government debt, in a
multi-period model with interest-rate risk.
7Alternatively, we would have to distinguish between markets for sale of the durable in period 0
before enjoyment of the period 0 service ow and after such enjoyment (but while the durable can
still be used as collateral). The device of treating the asset and its service ow as separate \goods"
allows us instead to write a single budget constraint for each period. The need for a rental market
is especially evident once we allow for the possibility of central-bank purchases of the durable, given
that the central bank cannot consume the service ow.
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non-durable and eh3  0 of the durable in period 0,8 and an initial endowment ehs1  0
of the non-durable in state s of period 1. (There are no further period-1 endowments
of the durable.) The preference ordering of household h is represented by a utility
function uh : R2(S+1)+ ! R, dened over consumption xh = (xhl ; xh1l; : : : ; xhSl) 2 R2(S+1)+
of the rst two goods (l = 1; 2); this function is assumed to be increasing in each of
its arguments and strictly quasi-concave. We shall also use the notation xh3  0 for
the quantity of the durable good held as an asset in period 0, though this is not an
element of the vector xh (which denotes only the consumption plan).
1.1 Monetary Policy in a Finite-Horizon Model
In addition to the decision to accumulate the durable good, we allow trading in -
nancial assets of several types. Money is a riskless nominal government liability. It
does not matter, in our simple model, whether money is a nominal liability of the
government itself, or a liability of the central bank (\backed" by an equal quantity
of nominal government debt held on the balance sheet of the central bank), as we
abstract from any transactions role of central-bank liabilities; in our model, like the
baseline model of Wallace (1981), base money and Treasury bills are equivalent as-
sets, and must earn the same return in equilibrium. Each household has an initial
endowment mh  0 of money in period 0; m  Phmh > 0 is therefore the initial
\money supply."9
Money yields a riskless nominal return i; that is, one unit of money held after
trading in period 0 becomes a claim to (1+i) units of money in period 1, regardless of
the state s. This riskless nominal interest rate is a policy variable, that may be freely
set by the central bank; this represents \conventional monetary policy" in our model.
Note that the central bank is free to set the interest rate on its liabilities (in practice,
the interest rate paid on overnight balances held at the central bank) at whatever
level it likes, given that the unit of account is only dened in terms of balances held
at the central bank, and the only link between the unit of account in two successive
8As explained below, for purposes of pricing the various goods, we number the non-durable as
good 1, the service ow from the durable as good 2, and the durable as good 3.
9Despite our reference to the \money supply," this variable actually represents total initial nom-
inal liabilities of the government, aggregating both Treasury securities in the hands of the public
and central-bank liabilities (base money); alternatively, it is the supply of nominal government debt,
aggregating government debt directly held by the public and that held by the central bank.
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periods arises from the central bank's willingness to deliver future money in exchange
for money held now on particular terms.10 Under the assumption that m > 0; so
that some amount of money earning the return i must be voluntarily held, in any
equilibrium (dened below) i will also have to be the rate of return on any other
(privately issued) riskless nominal asset that may be traded; hence monetary policy
determines \the" riskless nominal interest rate.
There is, however, an important constraint on the central bank's ability to freely
choose the value of i, under typical institutional arrangements. This is that it is not
possible to choose a value of i less than zero, if people are also free to hold currency
that oers a riskless nominal return of zero. In practice, currency (which for practical
reasons earns a return of zero) typically coexists with reserve balances at the central
bank (which instead pay interest), because of certain special uses for currency (not
modeled in this paper); but the fact that holders of reserves always have the right
to convert them into currency at a xed parity (one dollar of reserves = one dollar
of currency) prevents the central bank from driving the riskless rate below zero by
paying a negative interest rate on reserves.11
In our model, there are no special uses of currency, and so currency will not be
held in the case that the interest on reserves is positive. We may nonetheless suppose
that the central-bank liabilities on which the interest rate i is paid represent reserves
held at the central bank, and that holders have the right to demand zero-interest
10In practice, central banks choose the interest rate paid on reserves as a policy variable, but the
equilibrium riskless nominal rate of interest is not this rate, but one that diers from it because of
the liquidity premium earned by reserves owing to their role in the payments system; and central
banks inuence the riskless rate both by varying the interest rate paid on reserves and the supply of
reserves (which inuences the liquidity premium by aecting the scarcity of reserves), as discussed
in Woodford (2003, chap. 1). Here we simplify by abstracting from the existence of a liquidity
premium, as in the \cashless economy" of Woodford (2003, chap. 2). The analysis here is also
applicable to the case of an economy in which the supply of reserves is maintained at all times at
such a high level as to satiate the economy in reserves, allowing direct control of the riskless rate by
variations in the rate of interest paid on reserves, as in the \oor system" for the implementation
of monetary policy used by the Norges Bank (the central bank of Norway) over the past decade
(Bowman et al., 2010).
11In fact, the existence of small positive holding costs for currency mean that a slightly negative
interest rate on reserves is possible; but this does not change the fact that the existence of currency
puts a oor on the central bank's interest-rate target. For simplicity, we abstract from holding costs
of currency here, and treat the lower bound as exactly zero.
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currency in exchange for them, should they wish. Then, even though currency will
not be issued or held in any of our equilibria corresponding to policies i > 0; the
possibility of requesting currency matters, because it implies that the central bank
cannot choose a value of i less than zero. Setting i < 0 on reserves would simply
make currency the relevant central-bank liability | the one referred to as \money"
in our discussions below | rather than reserves. We accordingly simply assume that
a single kind of \money" is issued by the central bank, but that the nominal interest
rate paid on it must satisfy the constraint i  0:
Monetary policy also species the redemption value of money in each state s in
period 1. (Such redemption is necessary, in our nite-horizon model, since there is
no motive for anyone to wish to hold money in the terminal period.12) Each unit
of money is redeemed for a specied (positive) number of units of good 1 in state s;
then for each state s, the price ps1 of good 1 in units of money is xed by monetary
policy. One can think of this as a sort of \commodity money" scheme in period 1;
but it is intended to represent the fact that in an actual economy (with no terminal
period), the value of money each period is determined by monetary policy (in that
period and later), even under a pure at system.13 The revenues required to redeem
the money supply are raised through lump-sum taxation. The share of taxes raised
from each household h is h  0, assumed to be the same for each state s, whereP
h 
h = 1: Hence the tax obligation of household h in state s is hm(1 + i) in units
of money.
1.2 Private Borrowing with Endogenous Collateral Require-
ments
We also allow for trading in privately issued nancial claims; but contrary to what is
assumed in the Arrow-Debreu [A-D] model or in standard models of general equilib-
12The assumption that the government is committed to redeem money in the terminal period
will perhaps seem less surprising if it is recalled that \the money supply" actually refers to the
outstanding nominal liabilities of the government.
13See Woodford (2003, chap. 2) for illustration of how the price level (or exchange value of money)
can be determined in each of an innite sequence of periods purely by interest-rate policy in each
of the sequence of periods. In the present model, the price level in period 1 cannot be determined
by interest-rate policy in period 1, as there is no interest rate in a terminal period.
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rium with incomplete asset markets [GEI],14 we do not assume that households can
issue arbitrary quantities of nancial claims as long as they are able to deliver the
promised amount in each possible state of the world. Instead, we assume that bor-
rowing must be collateralized, as in the models of Geanakoplos (1997) and Araujo et
al. (2002), though the collateral requirements are determined endogenously (by what
people will pay for private nancial claims that are collateralized to a greater or lesser
extent), rather than specied exogenously (for example, by law or social custom). We
rst introduce the notation that we use to describe collateralized borrowing, and then
discuss what it means for the collateral requirements to be endogenously determined.
We assume that any privately issued nancial claim species a quantity of money
that must be repaid (independently of the state s) in order to extinguish the debt,
and also a quantity of the durable good that must be held by the borrower (i.e., issuer
of the claim) as collateral for the debt, and that can be seized by the lender (i.e.,
holder of the claim) in the event of default (i.e., non-payment of the specied amount
of money). We also assume that the claim gives the holder no rights to assets of the
issuer except the right to seize the assets pledged as collateral for the loan in the
event of default; and it gives the issuer the right to discharge the claim (preventing
seizure of the collateral) by paying the specied amount of money. Dierent types
of private nancial claims may simultaneously be traded, that are collateralized to
dierent extents; thus there may be both \prime" and \subprime" loans collateralized
by housing, where in our model the dierence relates to the value of the collateral
relative to the size of the loan, and not to any personal characteristics of the borrowers.
But we assume a competitive equilibrium in which arbitrary quantities of a given type
of nancial claim can be purchased at a given per-unit price; hence we may without
loss of generality normalize each of the types of private nancial claims so that \one
unit" of the claim promises delivery of one unit of money at maturity.
Thus we assume trading in a variety of types of privately issued nancial claims
j 2 J . Each asset j promises delivery of one unit of money in period 1, regardless of
the state s. The collateral requirement for asset j is denoted Cj  0; any issuer must
hold Cj units of the durable in period 0 per unit sold of asset j. Given the possibility
of default, the actual payo of asset j in state s is min(1; ps3Cj) in units of money,
where ps3 is the price of the durable (in units of money) in state s of period 1. We
let qj denote the price (in units of money) at which assets of type j trade in period 0.
14See Geanakoplos and Zame (2013) for discussion of these alternative model structures.
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Thus far, we have supposed that the set of assets that may be issued and the
collateral requirement associated with each of them is given; but in fact, these can be
endogenously determined. As rst proposed by Geanakoplos (1997) and developed
more thoroughly by Geanakoplos and Zame (2013), we may actually suppose that
competitive markets exist in which all possible collateralized nancial claims are
traded, though the equilibrium quantities issued of most of these securities will be
zero. (The \market-determined" collateral requirements will then simply be those
values of collateral for which the existence of such a market is not redundant.)
In the present example, the set of possible private nancial claims corresponds
to dierent possible values of Cj. Moreover, one can show that it suces to assume
trading in a particular nite set of assets, j = 1; : : : ; S; such that
Cj = 1=pj3 (1.1)
for each j; that is, asset j is a claim with a collateral requirement such that if state
j is realized in period 1, the value of the collateral will exactly equal the face value
of the debt. In the case of any equilibrium for an economy with a set of private
nancial claims that includes the S types (1.1), but possibly other types as well,
there necessarily exists a corresponding equilibrium for an economy with only the S
markets (1.1) open, in which the prices of all goods and assets traded in the restricted
economy are the same as in the original equilibrium, and the consumption allocation
is also the same. (See Proposition 1 of Araujo et al., 2012.15)
Because of this result, we do not reduce the set of equilibria by assuming that
only (at most) the set of S assets dened above are traded.16 From now on, we
assume that J = f1; : : : ; Sg and Cs = 1=ps3 for each j. These are our endogenously
determined collateral requirements, as in Araujo et al. (2012).
15The model and denition of equilibrium with collateral constraints in Araujo et al. (2012) is
somewhat dierent than here, because of the absence of money, monetary policy, or a central bank
in that paper. But the demonstration in the earlier paper that the S assets of the form (1.1) suce
applies directly to the present extension of the model as well.
16In fact, asset 1 is also redundant, as shown in Lemma 1 below. We nonetheless retain a market
for asset 1 in our notation for the general case, in order to preserve a simple association between the
number of the asset and the state in which the value of the collateral just suces to allow repayment
in full of the debt.
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1.3 Equilibrium
Let p1; p2; p3 denote the prices (in units of money) of the non-durable, the service
ow from the durable, and the durable good respectively in period 0, and similarly
let ps1; ps2; ps3 be the prices of the same three goods in state s in period 1. In fact,
we necessarily have have ps3 = ps2 in each state s (as there is no reason to acquire
the durable in period 1 other than to enjoy the period 1 service ow). We then have
2S+3 goods prices to determine (where we omit the redundant prices fps3g from the
price vector), along with the S privately-issued nancial asset prices. Each household
h chooses a consumption plan xh and a portfolio described by a vector  h 2 RS+ of
asset purchases (lending), a vector 'h 2 RS+ of asset issuance (borrowing), a quantity
h  0 of post-trade period 0 money balances, and a quantity xh3  0 of post-trade
holdings of the durable good. Note that we must separately specify nancial asset
purchases and issuances (rather than simply net trades, as in a GEI model), because
of the need to satisfy the collateral requirements, that are increased by issuance of
nancial claims but not reduced by purchases of such claims. These are the prices
and quantities that we seek to determine.
Given prices and nancial conditions described by p 2 R2S+3++ , q 2 RS+, C 2 RS+;
and i  0; household h chooses a consumption plan and portfolio (xh;  h; 'h; h; xh3)
that solve the problem
max




1   eh1) + p2(xh2   xh3) + p3(xh3   eh3) + q  ( h   'h) + h  mh  0;
ps1(x
h
s1   ehs1) + ps2(xhs2   xh3) 
SX
j=1
( hj   'hj )minf1; ps2Cjg






A competitive equilibrium is then dened as usual as a situation in which each house-
hold's plan is optimal and markets clear. Our concept of competitive equilibrium with
endogenous collateral constraints involves the additional requirement that the set of
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privately issued assets include all non-redundant nancial assets of the kind discussed
above.
Denition 1 Let an economy E be dened by preferences and endowments (uh(); eh1 ;
eh3 ; fehs1gs2S) for each h 2 H and a monetary policy specication (i; fps1gs2S). Then
an equilibrium for the economy E is a vector [(x;  ; '; ; x3); (p; q); C] consistent with
the monetary policy specication, such that in addition
(i) for each h 2 H, (xh;  h; 'h; h; xh3) solves problem (1.2), given prices (p; q), the





















































h = m; and
(ix) Cs = 1=ps2 for each s 2 S.
Here condition (ix) reects the endogenous determination of the collateral require-
ments (1.1).
A useful general observation about equilibrium in this model is the following.
Lemma 1 Consider any equilibrium of any economy E : Then either the market for
asset 1 (private debt contracts which are so poorly collateralized that they default in
all states but the one in which the durable good has its highest value) is inactive, in the
sense that zero units of this security are issued in equilibrium; or it is inessential, in
the sense that the same allocation of resources and same prices for all goods and assets
could also be obtained as an equilibrium if the market were closed (i.e., if all households




Proof. The state-contingent payos on a unit of asset 1 are equivalent to those on C1
units of the durable good (after the period 0 service ow). A household will therefore
be unwilling to purchase any units of asset 1 at any price higher than (p3 p2)C1; since
C1 units of the durable could be purchased at that price, yielding the same period
1 state-contingent return and relaxing the household's collateral constraint as well.
Moreover, no household will be willing to purchase any units when q1 = (p3   p2)C1
exactly, either, except if the household's collateral constraint does not bind.
On the other hand, an issuer must hold C1 units of the durable in order to issue
a unit of asset 1, and surrenders the durable in all states in period 1. (Technically,
there need be no default in state 1, the state in which the durable is most valuable;
but the issuer must pay the holder of the security an amount that is as costly as
surrender of the durable in that state as well.) Hence the issuer obtains no income
in any state in period 1 from the transaction, and so will not be willing to issue the
security at any price less than (p3   p2)C1; the cost of the collateral that will then
have to be surrendered.
It follows that asset 1 cannot be issued and held, in equilibrium, unless q1 = (p3 
p2)C1, and the households that hold asset 1 would obtain no value from a relaxation
of their collateral constraints. But then the same equilibrium (same allocation x and
same prices (p; q)) can be obtained if the market for asset 1 is closed: the issuers of
asset 1 could simply sell the collateral (after collecting the period 0 rental income
from it) to the buyers instead, rather than using the collateral to back issuance of
asset 1. The issuers should be indierent between this plan and issuance of asset 1,
since they must surrender the durable in all states in period 1 anyway, and since they
would obtain the same sale price in period 0. The buyers should be indierent as
well, as they obtain an asset with the same state-contingent returns in period 1, pay
the same price in period 0, and do not care about the fact that acquiring the durable
relaxes their collateral constraints. Hence if an equilibrium exists in which asset 1 is
issued, the existence of this market is inessential. 
The model is one that allows, in general, for the coexistence of multiple types
of privately issued debt that default with dierent probabilities (and hence promise
dierent rates of interest, conditional upon repayment, as well). But Lemma 1 shows
that more than two states in period 1 are necessary in order for default to occur in
equilibrium, at least on securities the existence of which matters for the character of
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equilibrium.17
Another useful general result concerns the market for riskless (fully collateralized)
private debt securities (asset S).
Lemma 2 There exists no equilibrium in which qS < 1=(1+ i): Moreover, if in equi-
librium, some household h holds a quantity of collateral xh3 that exceeds the quantity
required to satisfy the household's collateral constraint,then qS = 1=(1+ i): Finally, if
in equilibrium, qS > 1=(1 + i); no units of asset S are issued in equilibrium, and the
market is inessential, in the sense that the same equilibrium could be obtained if the
market were to be closed.
Proof. The period-1 return on one unit of asset S and on 1=(1 + i) units of money
are identical: in either case, the holder obtains one unit of money in period 1, in every
possible state s. (Recall that CS = 1=p2S  1=p2s 8s 2 S: Thus private borrowing
under a contract of type S is suciently collateralized to be perfectly safe.) Since a
positive quantity of money earning the interest rate i must be held in equilibrium,
it is necessary that qS  1=(1 + i); otherwise, money would not be held. But if
qS > 1=(1 + i); no household will choose to hold asset S, since money is a perfect
substitute available more cheaply; hence this would have to be an equilibrium with
no issuance of asset S, and one in which the market for asset S is inessential.
One can also show that no equilibrium of the latter sort is possible if at least
one household type has excess collateral. For suppose that qS > 1=(1 + i): Then any
household can obtain an arbitrage prot, relaxing its budget constraint in period 0,
by increasing h by a quantity  > 0 and issuing (1+ i) units of asset S. (This would
result in no change in its period 1 budget in any state of the world, but increase
the amount that it can spend on either non-durable consumption or rental of durable
goods in period 0, given that the proceeds of issuance of the riskless debt would exceed
the addition to its money balances.) Each household must, under an optimal plan,
exploit this opportunity to the greatest extent allowed by the collateral constraint.
If there exists any household with a collateral constraint that remains slack, no such
opportunity must exist, and hence qS = 1=(1 + i) exactly. 
17We nonetheless nd it convenient to study mainly examples with only two states below. This
means that the occurrence of default in equilibrium is not essential for the type of nancial frictions
with which we are concerned. In the equilibria that we study, the possibility of default can lead
to distortions of the equilibrium allocation of resources, even though in most of our examples no
default actually occurs.
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The signicance of this result is to show that if riskless private debt exists, it must
promise the nominal interest rate i set by monetary policy. Hence our model is one
in which the central bank has eective control of the riskless (one-period) nominal
interest rate, subject to the constraint that it must choose a value i  0:
1.4 A Neutrality Result for Conventional Monetary Policy
We rst consider the eects of \conventional" monetary policy, by which we mean
changes in the nominal interest-rate target i, while assuming (for now) that the central
bank holds no assets other than riskless nominal government debt (one-period bills)
on its balance sheet. We can obtain a simpler characterization of the eects of such
policy if we generalize the model just set out to allow for possible (positive or negative)
lump-sum transfers of additional money to households in period 0, which additional
money is redeemed in period 1 as described above.
Let h be an additional lump-sum net transfer (in units of money) to household
h in period 0, where we assume that h >  mh8h; so that each household continues
to have a positive endowment of money after the transfers. The household's budget
constraints continue to be as written above, except that the endowment mh must be
replaced by the post-transfer endowment ~mh  mh + h; and the aggregate money
supply m (that is redeemed in period 1) must be replaced by ~m  Ph ~mh: The
denition of equilibrium remains as in Denition 1, except that m must be replaced
by ~m in condition (viii). We can then show the following about a certain kind of
combined monetary and scal policy.
Proposition 1 Consider an economy E (which includes a specication of the ini-
tial money endowments fmhgh2H), and let period-1 monetary policy commitments
fps1gs2S be xed, but consider alternative interest-rate policies i  0: Suppose that




mh 8h 2 H (1.3)
for some parameter i >  1: Then in the exible-price model, variations in interest-
rate policy have no eect on the equilibrium allocation of resources x, on any relative
prices (p2=p1; p3=p1; ps2=ps1; qj=p1), or on any real rates of return ((1 + i)p1=ps1;
ps3=(p3   p2)  p1=ps1, minf1; ps2Cjg  p1=qjps1). That is, if there is an equilibrium
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associated with a given value of i, then for any other value of the interest rate (leaving
unchanged the fps1g and all other aspects of the specication of the economy, but
changing the scal transfers in accordance with (1.3)), there exists a corresponding
equilibrium, in which the allocation, relative prices, and real rates of return are the
same, as are all period 1 prices, while period 0 prices vary inversely with 1 + i:
Proof. One observes that the household problem (1.2) can be written entirely in
terms of choice variables xh; xh3 ;  





s1; and the real money endowment ~m
h=p1; the collateral requirements fCjg;
period 0 relative prices p2=p1; p3=p1; q=p1; period 1 prices; and the quantity (1 + i)p1,
but not p1 or i individually. The requirements for equilibrium can also be written
entirely in terms of these variables.
Consider now any equilibrium associated with a given value of i and a given set
of scal transfers. Associated with this equilibrium are particular values for each
of the variables listed in the previous paragraph. If now i is varied (to some other
non-negative value), these same values for each of those variables will continue to
constitute an equilibrium, if the unchanged value of ~mh=p1 continues to be consistent
with households' post-transfer money endowments, despite the implied change in p1.
If scal transfers are zero, so that ~mh = mh, this will not be true (given that mh
is not zero for all households), for constancy of (1 + i)p1 would require p1 to vary
inversely with (1 + i); but if p1 changes, m
h=p1 will not be invariant (for any h with







The numerator of this quantity is unchanged by the change in policy, and the denom-
inator will be unchanged if (1 + i)p1 does not change.
Hence an equilibrium exists for arbitrary i  0 with the properties stated in the
proposition. Because p1 varies inversely with 1+i, and the relative prices p2=p1; p3=p1;
qj=p1 are invariant, all period 0 prices must vary inversely with 1 + i: 
Technically, this proposition does not show that interest-rate policy alone can
inuence the general level of prices in period 0 (though that is easy to establish), since
the policy assumed in the proposition is a combination of monetary and scal policy.
However, the size of the scal transfers required to achieve the exact result are only
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proportional to the initial money endowments. If we consider the case of a \cashless
limiting economy," by letting mh ! 0 for all h, while holding xed the specication
of all other aspects of preferences and endowments, then the scal transfers that are
required in order to obtain the result of Proposition 1 with regard to the eects of
interest-rate policy converge to zero as well, while the predicted eects of a change
in i on the other variables all converge to well-dened limiting values.
Hence in such a cashless limit, it is easy to see that interest-rate policy can de-
termine the general level of prices in period 0, and indeed that any price level below
a certain upper bound (the one achieved by the \loosest" possible policy, i = 0) is
achievable by an appropriate choice of interest-rate policy, even in the absence of s-
cal transfers. Moreover, interest-rate policy has an eect on prices of the conventional
sign: a \tightening" of current policy (raising i) is disinationary (lowers the period
0 prices of all goods).
But the simple case also shows that conventional monetary policy need not be
able to aect any real quantities or relative prices. In a cashless limiting economy
(with exible prices, as here), interest-rate policy will have no eect on real quantities,
and by continuity, the eects continue to be small as long as money endowments are
small enough. Even when money endowments are non-negligible, Proposition 1 can
be viewed as showing that any real eects of interest-rate policy in our exible-price
model are due only to a failure to oset the scal eects of a change in interest-rate
policy on the period-1 value of households' money endowments. Once these scal
eects are neutralized, through the transfers specied in (1.3), interest-rate policy
has no real eects.18
2 Collateral Constraints and the Eects of
Unconventional Policy
We now consider additional (\unconventional") dimensions of policy, by allowing the
central bank to purchase assets other than government debt with a riskless one-period
nominal return, nancing such purchases either by issuing riskless nominal liabilities
18Note, however, that even in the cashless limit, interest-rate policy will have real eects in the case
of price stickiness. The implications of collateral constraints for the real eects of both conventional
and unconventional monetary policies in a sticky-price model will be pursued in future work.
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of its own, or by selling other assets held on its balance sheet. Purchases of riskless
one-period nominal government debt, nanced by issuing equivalent liabilities of the
central bank itself, will obviously have no eect on equilibrium, since the supply of
\outside money" will not change. But what if the central bank purchases a risky
asset, namely the durable good, and nances the purchases by increasing the supply
of \money" | either by issuing additional riskless central-bank liabilities, or selling
riskless government debt that had previously been held by the central bank? Can
such transactions by the central bank change the equilibrium prices of nancial assets,
and as a consequence inuence macroeconomic equilibrium more generally? And if
so, are the eects similar to or dierent from the eects of interest-rate policy?
Suppose that the central bank can hold durables on its balance sheet at the end
of period 0, in addition to its holdings of riskless nominal government debt.19 We let
xCB3 denote the central bank's holdings of the durable, and treat this as an additional
policy variable. We assume that the central bank has no use for the service ow from
the durable, and therefore rents the durables that it holds, while owning the asset.
When we compare equilibria associated with alternative quantities of durables
purchases by the central bank, we must also take account of the implications for
the supply of \outside money" (riskless nominal assets in the hands of the public,
other than those supplied by private issuers). We suppose, as in the previous section,
that households come into period 0 with endowments fmhg of money, and that the





3 is the total supply of durables). The central bank's holdings x
CB
3 of
the durable therefore represent purchases during period 0, resulting in a total money
supply of
M = m+ (p3   p2)xCB3 : (2.1)
Note that p3   p2 is the part of the purchase price of a durable that the central
bank must nance other than out of the rental income received in period 0 from the
19In practice, central banks are more likely to hold securities that represent claims to income ows
linked to real estate, rather than directly owning real estate. Nonetheless, it is the nature of the risk
to which the assets acquired by the central bank are exposed that matters for the analysis here, and
not whether the asset is real property or a nancial claim. Also, in our model, the durable good is
the only acceptable form of collateral for private borrowing, and central banks certainly do acquire
risky assets, such as longer-term Treasury bonds, that are commonly used as collateral in nancial
transactions.
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asset. And the quantity of money in the hands of the public increases by this amount
whether the shortfall is nanced by creating new central-bank liabilities or by selling
riskless government debt previously held on the central bank's balance sheet.
The outside money supply dened in (2.1) must again be redeemed in period 1,
but there are now assets of the central bank (other than liabilities of the govern-
ment) that can be used to redeem part of it. In general, though, the value of the
additional assets will not exactly cancel the increased value of the money that must
be redeemed. In other words, there are scal consequences of the central bank's
balance-sheet gains and losses, given that its assets and liabilities no longer have
equal state-contingent returns in general. Any trading prots of the central bank are
assumed to be distributed lump-sum to households in period 1, and any losses are
correspondingly assumed to be made up by lump-sum taxation of the households;
these net lump-sum transfers are assumed to be distributed across households in the
same proportions fhg as other taxes and transfers. The net lump-sum tax obligation
of household h in period 1 is therefore now equal to h[(1 + i)M   ps2xCB3 ] in state s,
where M is dened in (2.1).
Since feasible purchases of durables by the central bank must satisfy the bound
0  xCB  e3; it is useful to parameterize this dimension of policy by the fraction
! of the aggregate supply of durables purchased by the central bank. Thus we
write xCB3 = !e3; where the policy parameter ! is constrained to lie in the range
0  !  1:20 In terms of this notation, the problem of household h is now to maximize
uh(xh) subject to the same constraints as in (1.2), except that the budget constraint
in period 1, state s, now takes the form
ps1(x
h




j   'hj )minf1; ps2Cjg
+h[(1 + i)(m+ (p3   p2)!e3)  ps2!e3]  (1 + i)h  0: (2.2)
An equilibrium is again dened as in Denition 1, except that now the policy




xh3 = (1  !)e3; (2.3)
20In fact, we shall only consider policies ! < 1; so that a private market for the durable continues
to exist.
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and condition (viii) must now be written
HX
h=1
h = m+ (p3   p2)!e3: (2.4)
With this generalized denition of equilibrium (but again allowing initial money en-
dowments to be modied through lump-sum transfers in period 0), Proposition 1
will continue to hold;21 interest-rate policy will again have no real eects, except
those due to the scal consequences of changes in the period 1 value of households'
money endowments. But we now have an additional dimension of policy to consider,
however, which is the eect of variations in !:
2.1 Irrelevance of Central-Bank Asset Purchases when
Collateral is Sucient
A rst important result is that there need not be any eects of central-bank asset
purchases at all, on either real or nominal variables.
Proposition 2 In a exible-price model with central-bank asset purchases of quantity
0  ! < 1; suppose there is an equilibrium in which each household h holds a quantity
of collateral xh3 that exceeds the quantity required to satisfy the household's collateral
constraint. Then for any ! satisfying ! < ! < 1 and









additional central-bank purchases that increase the central bank's share of durables to
! result in an equilibrium in which all prices are unchanged (both goods prices and
asset prices), and the consumption allocation fxhgh2H is similarly unchanged.
Proof. Consider any value of ! satisfying (2.5). (Note that the assumption that
each household holds excess collateral implies that there is an open interval of such
values.22) Suppose that prices continue to be given by (p; q; and that the collateral
requirements continue to be given by C:
21The same proof as above goes through, requiring only minor modications.
22Here we rely on the assumption of only a nite number of household types. In the case of
an innite number of household types, it would be necessary to strengthen the hypothesis of the
proposition to require the existence of a positive lower bound for the right-hand-side of (2.5).
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Then for each household h, it is possible to achieve the same consumption plan
xh as before, with a portfolio plan that is the same as before, except that now
xh3 = x
h
3   h(!   !)e3 (2.6)
and
h = h + (p3   p2)h(!   !)e3: (2.7)
Condition (2.5) guarantees that the right-hand side of (2.6) is non-negative, while
the assumption that ! > ! guarantees that the right-hand side of (2.7) is non-
negative as well; thus these stipulations remain consistent with the non-negativity
constraints on the household's portfolio. Substitution of the proposed consumption
and portfolio plan into the budget constraints veries that each is still satised. And
nally, condition (2.5) guarantees that the household's collateral constraint continues
to be satised. Hence the proposed plan is feasible for each household h.
One can further show that the proposed plan is not only feasible for household
h, but optimal. This requires that we show that no consumption plan preferable to
xh is attainable. Consider any consumption plan ~xh such that uh(~xh) > uh(xh): It
follows that for any convex combination
x^h  (1  )xh + ~xh;
where 0 <  < 1; x^h will also be strictly preferred to xh; given the quasi-concavity of
preferences.
Now suppose that consumption plan ~xh is attainable, that is, that there exists a
plan (~xh; ~ 
h
; ~'h; ~h; ~xh3) that is consistent with all of the household's constraints in







S = qS ~'
h
S + (p3   p2)h(!   !)e3;
would satisfy the household's budget constraints in both period 0 and period 1, under
the original policy !: (Here we use Lemma 2 to show that the period 1 budget
constraint is satised in each state.) Given that ! > !; this plan obviously satises
all non-negativity constraints as well.
Moreover, because of the convexity of the constraint set, any convex combination
of the optimal plan under policy ! and this plan will also satisfy the household's bud-
get constraints in both periods, and will satisfy all non-negativity constraints. And
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since the collateral constraint is (by hypothesis) a strict inequality under the optimal
plan, there exists some suciently small  > 0 for which the convex combination of
the plans will also satisfy the collateral constraint. Hence the convex combination
plan satises all of the household's constraints, under the original policy !:
This would imply that the convex combination consumption plan x^h is attainable
under the policy !: But since x^h is strictly preferable to xh, this contradicts the
assumption that the household's behavior in the equilibrium associated with policy !
is optimal. Hence we may conclude that the plan described by (2.6){(2.7) is optimal,
under the unchanged prices (p; q) and collateral requirements C.
One can further show that this collection of plans for the households implies











h + (p3   p2)(!   !)e3 = m+ (p3   p2)!e3;
so that conditions (2.3) and (2.4) are satised. The other market-clearing conditions
are unchanged by the change in !: Finally, condition (ix) of Denition 1 continues
to be satised, since neither the prices nor the collateral requirements have changed.
Hence all requirements for equilibrium are satised. 
Thus in this case, we obtain an irrelevance result for central-bank asset purchases
in the spirit of Wallace (1981), though we do not assume A-D nancial markets, as
Wallace does.23 It is also worth pointing out that while Wallace's result appears to
prove too much | his baseline model is one in which the central bank is also unable
to inuence short-term nominal interest rates,24 something that is obviously not true
23It might be thought that the result requires an assumption about the suciency of collateral
that implies that the equilibrium of our model is equivalent to an A-D equilibrium, but this is not
quite correct. It is possible, at least in non-generic cases, that the set of assets allowed for in our
model will not span all states of the world; yet Proposition 2 remains true in this case as well. In fact,
the form of proof given above can be used to establish irrelevance of central-bank purchases in a GEI
model, without any need for the assumption about the quantity of collateral held by households.
24This is because his model assumes a zero nominal interest rate on money, and so (in the absence
of nancial frictions) concludes that the equilibrium interest rate on riskless nominal claims must
be zero, regardless of monetary policy. In fact, a similar irrelevance result for open-market asset
purchases can be obtained in general-equilibrium monetary models in which money is assumed to
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in actual economies | our model is one in which the central bank can control the
short-term nominal interest rate (subject to the zero lower bound), including under
the assumptions of Proposition 2; but it does not follow that open-market purchases
of risky assets will necessarily have any eect on nancial conditions.
Proposition 2 demonstrates the fallacy in a common way of discussing the eects
of asset purchases. Central banks often appeal, in their explanations of the eects
that they expect their asset-purchase programs to have, to a theory of \portfolio
balance eects": if the central bank holds less of certain assets and more of others,
then the private sector is forced (as a requirement for equilibrium) to hold more of the
former and less of the latter, and (according to this theory) a change in the relative
prices of the assets should be required to induce the private parties to change the
portfolios that they prefer. In order for such an eect to exist, it is thought to suce
that private parties not be perfectly indierent between the two types of assets, owing
to dierences in their pattern of state-contingent payos.25
But Proposition 2 shows that this is not the case. The aw in the \portfolio-
balance" theory is a simple one. The theory assumes that if the private sector is
forced to hold a portfolio that includes more exposure to a particular risk | say, a
low return in the event of a real-estate crash | then private investors' willingness to
hold that particular risk will be reduced: investors will anticipate a higher marginal
utility of income in the state in which the real-estate crash occurs, and so will pay
less than before for securities that have especially low returns in that state. But
the fact that the central bank takes the real-estate risk onto its own balance sheet,
pay a zero nominal interest rate, but a spread exists between the return on money and other riskless
short-term assets, because of a special role for money in facilitating transactions. In such models, the
irrelevance result applies to balance-sheet policies that do not alter the volume of monetary liabilities
of the central bank, but only shift the composition of its assets (Curdia and Woodford, 2010), or
to asset purchases when the supply of money is already sucient to keep the short-term nominal
interest rate at the zero lower bound (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003). Curdia and Woodford
highlight the importance of an absence of nancial frictions, other than the transactions frictions
that create a special role for money and possible incompleteness of the set of traded securities, for
such a result. (This discussion is in section 1 of the working paper version of their paper, but is
omitted from the published version.)
25Thus Gagnon et al. (2010) discuss the theoretical basis for the Fed's Large Scale Asset Purchase
program by noting that \the LSAPs have removed a considerable amount of assets with high duration
from the markets.... In addition, the purchases of MBS [mortgage-backed securities] reduce the
amount of prepayment risk that investors have to hold in the aggregate."
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and allows the representative household to hold only securities that pay as much in
the event of a crash as in other states, does not make the risk disappear from the
economy. The central bank's earnings on its portfolio will be lower in the crash state
as a result of the asset exchange, and this will mean lower earnings distributed to the
Treasury, which will in turn mean that higher taxes will have to be collected by the
government from the private sector in that state; so households' after-tax income will
be just as dependent on the real-estate risk as before. This is why the asset pricing
kernel does not change, in the case illustrated by Proposition 2, and why asset prices
are unaected by the open-market operation.
In fact, households that correctly understand the scal implications of the asset-
purchase policy have a motive to change their own portfolios (assuming unchanged
prices) in ways that exactly oset the transactions of the central bank. If household
h bears fraction h of the scal consequences, this creates a hedging motive for a
portfolio shift that osets exactly h of the central bank's trades (selling fraction h
of the durables purchased by the central bank, and increasing its money holdings by
fraction h of the increase in the money supply); summing over all households, the
central bank's transactions are exactly oset.
We can thus already give an answer to the question whether central-bank asset
purchases have eects that are equivalent to those achieved by a cut in the short-term
nominal interest rate in the case of conventional monetary policy. When Proposition 2
applies, the answer is obviously no. If the scal transfers hypothesized in Proposition
1 are also present (or a cashless limiting economy is considered), then neither policy
would have any eect on real quantities; but interest-rate policy would still be able to
inuence the general price level (for example, to head o unwanted deation, as long
as it is not constrained by the zero lower bound), while asset purchases would have no
eect on equilibrium prices or quantities. (Nor, in the case described by Proposition
2, is there any eect on nancial market prices, while conventional monetary policy
inuences not just the riskless rate but the equilibrium interest rates on the various
types of risky private debts as well.)
The validity of Proposition 2 depends, however, on the assumption that all house-
holds have more collateral than they need to satisfy their collateral constraints. The
interest of the result therefore depends on this being a possibility. The following
result indicates that such a situation can indeed occur.
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Proposition 3 Consider a exible-price economy in which all households are iden-
tical, both as to their preferences and their endowments, and pay an equal share of
taxes (h = 1=H 8h) as well. Then for any specication of central-bank policy with
! < 1, there is an equilibrium in which each household holds durables in excess of the
quantity required to satisfy its collateral requirement.
Proof. If all households have the same preferences and endowments, the household
problem (1) is the same for each of them. Then because the household's budget set is
convex and the common preferences are assumed to be strictly quasi-concave, there
is a unique optimal consumption plan that solves this problem for any prices (p; q)
and collateral requirements C, though the associated portfolio plan may be indeter-
minate. It follows that each household necessarily chooses the same consumption
plan in equilibrium. Market clearing is then only possible if each household chooses
to consume exactly its share of the aggregate endowment. Hence the equilibrium











s1 8s; xhs2 = e3 8s
for each h 2 H; where stars indicated the common endowments of each of the goods.
This plan can be seen to be consistent with the household's budget constraints if
the household's portfolio plan satises





j  0 8j;
X
j
('hj =pj2)  (1  !)e3: (2.8)
One possible way to satisfy all requirements of (2.8) is by choosing  hj = '
h
j =
0 8j; though this is not the unique solution; thus these conditions can be satised.
Moreover, any specication of portfolio plans for the households that satisfy the above
conditions will satisfy all market-clearing conditions for assets.
It remains only to show that there exist prices under which it will be optimal for a
household to choose the feasible plan described above. The prices required can then
be determined from the household's marginal rates of substitution, evaluated at this
consumption plan. They are in fact the prices associated with an A-D equilibrium.
Since the consumption plan xh specied above is the optimal element of the A-D
budget set dened by these prices, and the budget set in our model is a proper subset
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of the A-D budget set, the plan (which is also feasible in our model) must be the
optimal element of the budget set in our model as well. Hence we have described an
equilibrium.
If the equilibrium is supported by a portfolio plan for each household h in which
 hj = '
h
j = 0 8j; then since (1   !)e3 > 0; the collateral constraint is a strict
inequality for each household. This establishes the existence of an equilibrium in
which each household holds excess collateral. We can also have equilibria in which
one or more households is both an issuer and a purchaser (in equal quantities) of
private debt securities, to such an extent as to use all of its available collateral in
issuing such securities. (There is no economic motive for a household to do so, but no
penalty either, given that we abstract from transactions costs in our model.) But even
in such a case, the collateral constraint could actually be tightened without requiring
the household to change its consumption allocation, or to change its behavior in any
way that interferes with market clearing. Thus even if the hypothesis of Proposition
2 would technically not be satised in such a case, the conclusion could still be
established. 
This result shows that it is possible to have an economy for which the hypothesis of
Proposition 2 holds. Proposition 3 might seem to refer to an extremely special case, as
it requires exact equality between the endowment patterns of the dierent households.
But in fact the result that the collateral constraints do not bind in equilibrium for any
household will continue to be true for any economy with an endowment pattern close
enough to one satisfying the assumptions of Proposition 3: as long as the households
have endowment patterns that are similar enough, there will be no need for them to
choose large net positions in the nancial assets, or for them to choose to hold much
less than their proportional share of the aggregate supply of durables not held by the
central bank, so that households will all continue to hold durables in excess of the
quantity needed to satisfy their collateral requirement. Thus there will be an open
set of endowment specications satisfying the hypothesis of Proposition 2, though we
omit a formal demonstration of this.
But while robust examples can be constructed to which the irrelevance result of
Proposition 2 applies, it is equally possible to construct robust examples of economies
in which central-bank asset purchases do aect nancial conditions | and aect the
equilibrium allocation of resources, not just prices, as we now explain.
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2.2 A Special Case: Homothetic Preferences, Two States
The case in which collateral is insucient, so that collateral constraints bind for at
least some households, is more complex to analyze, and the eects of central-bank
asset purchases depend on the precise way in which the constraints bind. In order to
illustrate some of the dierent possible cases, and provide insight into the conditions
under which they arise, it is useful to consider a special case of the model proposed
above, in which the number of endogenous variables that must simultaneously be
determined can be reduced to a minimum without trivializing the problem with which
we are concerned.
We can simplify our analysis by restricting attention to the case of two equi-
probable possible states (s = 1; 2) in period 1, and supposing further that the utility
function of each household h is of the form













where u(xh1 ; x
h
2) is a homothetic function, in addition to being strictly increasing and
strictly concave. Note that we assume identical preferences for all households, so that
any dierences in their asset demands (and any reasons for the irrelevance result of
Proposition 2 not to obtain) must be linked to dierences in endowment patterns.
Similarly, the assumption of an identical period sub-utility function over time and
across states means that any dierential valuation of income across states or over
time will have to result from non-uniform endowment patterns, rather than from
preferences. 26
The assumption of identical, homothetic preferences has useful consequences. It
implies that in any period, and any state of the world, each household chooses the
same relative consumption xh1=x
h
2 (given that all face the same relative price of the
two consumption goods, p2=p1), and thus is determined purely by p2=p1, regardless of
the intertemporal allocation of expenditure that is chosen. The relative consumption
of any household is given by xh1=x
h







26Here our goal is not to deny the potential importance of preferences in inuencing nancial
equilibrium, but simply to allow ourselves to parameterize the range of alternative cases that we
wish to discuss in a more parsimonious way. As we shall see, there remain a number of distinct
cases that must be considered.
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Since each household's demands are in this proportion, so are aggregate demands
for the two goods. Market clearing requires that the ratio of aggregate demands equal











l for l = 1; 3 are are the aggregate endowments of the two goods in
that period and state of the world.
In this way the relative prices p2=p1, p12=p11, p22=p21, can each be determined
from the economy's endowment pattern alone, in the exible-price model. These
must therefore be independent of policy, and can be solved for without having to
solve for the intertemporal allocation or asset prices. Hence we can treat them as
already known, in solving the rest of the model.
It is then possible to dene an indirect utility function
~u(c) = max
x1;x2




where c is the value of total expenditure (in units of the nondurable good) in a given
period and state of the world. The denition of the indirect utility function depends
on the value of (p2=p1); but this is independent of policy. However, the relative
price may dier across periods and states of the world (because of diering relative
endowments), so that the indirect utility function may dier as well. We shall use
the notation ~u(c) for the indirect utility function for period 0 expenditure, and ~us(c)
for the state s in period 1. Then the model can be written entirely in terms of the
intertemporal allocation of expenditure, without any further reference to endowments
or consumption of the two individual goods.
Since p11 and p21 are given as part of the specication of monetary policy, it follows
that we can also treat p12 and p22 as already known.
27 (Recall that this means that
p13 and p23 are already known as well.) The only goods prices that remain to be
determined are therefore p1 and p3. (Note that p1 can be viewed as the money price
of real expenditure, in the reduced model that avoids reference to individual goods.)
In a model with only two states in period 1, the number of types of private debt
securities that we must consider can be reduced to two, as discussed in section 1.2.
27We are interested in using the reduced-form description of the model developed in this section
to analyze the consequences of alternative choices of i and !; keeping xed the dimension of policy
that species the period 1 price-level targets.
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Moreover, the market for asset 1 is inessential, as shown in Lemma 1; so we can
economize on notation by eliminating the market for this asset. There is then only
one kind of private debt: riskless (fully collateralized) private debt (asset 2).28 By
Lemma 2, this must be equivalent to government-supplied money, in any equilibrium
where it is actually issued. There are thus no additional asset prices to determine in
equilibrium, given that i is xed by monetary policy.
There are also only two independent ways in which a household can shift income
between period 0 and period 1: either by holding or issuing money-equivalents (where
it does not matter whether government-supplied money or privately-issue riskless debt
is held), or by holding durable goods. A household can hold arbitrary positive quan-
tities of these two types of assets (subject to the constraint that period 0 expenditure
must be non-negative), but is limited in the extent to which it can hold a net nega-
tive position of either type: it cannot short the durable good at all,29 while the size
of its negative holdings of money-equivalents is subject to a limit proportional to
its holdings of the durable (because of the collateral requirement for issuing riskless
debt).
The implications of equilibrium asset prices for a household's ability to shift ex-
penditure over time and across states can then be specied in terms of the feasible














indicating the amount of real purchasing power transferred into each state s = 1; 2; as
a result of the household's portfolio decision, where the quantity in square brackets is
the household's net holding of money-equivalents. The only thing that matters about
the household's portfolio, in terms of the implications for its budget constraints in
period 1, is the implied value of this vector yh.
Let us assume that p12 6= p22; so that the durable is not a second asset with
28Fostel and Geanakoplos (2013) similarly establish that markets for risky collateralized debt are
inessential, in the case that there are only two possible states in the second period. Note that it
would not generally be true in the case of more than two states.
29Issuance of \asset 1" would amount to sale of a security that has the same state-contingent
payos as the durable good, but the collateral constraint implies that a household that issues asset
1 must hold an equivalent quantity of the durable as collateral, so that it is not able to achieve a
net negative position in assets with this pattern of returns.
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a riskless nominal return.30 (Using the convention proposed in section 1.2 for the
ordering of states, we shall therefore assume that p12 > p22: Then there is a unique
combination of money-equivalents and durables that must be held to achieve a given
vector yh; so given the market prices of the two types of assets, we can assign a
well-dened cost (in terms of reduced period 0 expenditure) of any choice of yh. This
cost will be a linear function a0yh; where a is a vector of state prices, dened as the































Given (p1; p3), these two equations can be uniquely solved for (a1; a2), and vice versa.
Hence we can alternatively treat the two \prices" that remain to be endogenously
determined in the model as (a1; a2).
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The constraints on a household's ability to choose a given vector of transfers yh
result not only from the market prices of assets, though, but also from the lower
bounds on its net asset positions just discussed. The fact that the durable (the only
asset that pays more, in nominal terms, in state 1 than in state 2) cannot be shorted
means that p11y
h
1 must be at least as large as p21y
h
2 for any household. And y
h
2 must
be non-negative, since the collateral constraint requires a household to hold durables
that are worth at least as much in state 2 as the face value of the riskless debt
issued by the household. Subject to these two inequalities, however, any vector yh
is attainable if the household is willing (and able) to reduce period 0 expenditure by
a0yh to pay for it.
The household decision problem can then be written in a more compact form, as






2 ) to maximize
30Note that this is a property of our specication of the economy, that either holds or does not,
independently of both interest-rate policy and asset-purchase policy. And for generic specications
it will hold.
31See Fostel and Geanakoplos (2013) for further discussion of the possibility of characterizing
households' budget constraints in terms of state prices, in the case that (as here) there are only two
possible states in the second period. Note that this would not always be possible if there were more
than two states.
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chs  ehs1 + yhs   h
(1 + i)M   ps2!e3
ps1
; for s = 1; 2 (2.14)
p21y
h
2  p11yh1 (2.15)
yh2  0 (2.16)
where eh  eh1 + (p2=p1)eh3 is the value of the household's \total non-durable endow-
ment" in period 0, if we split the endowment of the durable good into the period 0
service ow (counted as part of the \total non-durable endowment") and treat only
the value of the asset after the period 0 service ow as an asset endowment; and M is
the money supply dened in (2.1). Here (2.13) and (2.14) are the budget constraints
for period 0 expenditure and period 1 expenditure (in each of the two possible states)
respectively. Inequalities (2.15) and (2.16) are two additional restrictions implied by
the collateral constraint.32
Budget constraints (2.13){(2.14) are the same as in an A-D model; only the addi-
tional constraints (2.15){(2.16) make our model dierent. In the absence of the latter
two constraints, it would be possible to combine (2.13){(2.14) into a single intertem-
poral budget constraint, that makes no reference to the elements of yh. But we nd
it useful to write the separate period budget constraints as above in our model, since
32It might seem surprising that we obtain two inequality constraints for each household, given that
the collateral constraint is a single inequality constraint, indicating a minimum amount of collateral
that a household must hold, given all of the debt contracts that it issues of various sorts. However,
the required level of collateral in order to achieve a given vector of intertemporal transfers yh is not
a linear function of yh, for while more negative net holdings of a given asset (i.e., greater issuance
of that asset) increase the collateral requirement, more positive net holdings of the same asset do
not correspondingly reduce the collateral requirement. This results in a kink in the boundary of the
attainable region of the y1   y2 plane (see Figures 1 and 2 below). The boundary can therefore be
conveniently represented by a pair of linear constraints.
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the collateral constraints (2.15){(2.16) are more conveniently written in terms of the
vector yh.
We can write constraints (2.13){(2.14) purely in terms of the choice variables, the
state prices, and exogenous terms, if we use (2.1) to substitute for M , and then use
(2.10){(2.11) to express the period 0 goods prices as functions of the state prices.
The value of the household's initial asset endowment (the nal two terms in (2.13))





fhs  (ps2ps1 )eh3 + (1+ips1 )mh:
This way of writing it allows us to preserve the dependence of the value on the
endogenous state prices a. The quantities (fh1 ; f
h
2 ) are now known without having to
solve for endogenous asset prices or allocations, and in particular are independent of





2  eh + a1fh1 + a2fh2 (2.17)
We can write the household's problem still more compactly by treating the el-
ements of yh as the only choice variables, and solving equations (2.13){(2.14) for
the implied intertemporal allocation of expenditure (eh; eh1 ; e
h
2): We can use the solu-
tion to the latter system to substitute for the expenditure allocation in the objective
(2.12), and obtain an indirect utility function Uh(yh):We can then express the house-
hold's problem simply as the choice of yh to maximize Uh(yh) subject to constraints
(2.15){(2.16).
This indirect utility function, however, has the disadvantage of not being invariant
under changes in !; the size of central-bank asset purchases (even for xed prices).
It is therefore desirable instead to write the household's problem in terms of the
alternative choice variables



















Note that for given asset prices, a household's choice of yhs implies a value for ~y
h
s ,
and vice versa, so that we can consider ~yhs as a choice variable of household h, even
though some terms in this expression are not under the household's control.








2 because of (2.10), we





2  eh + a1fh1 + a2fh2 : (2.18)
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In addition, (2.14) can now be written more simply as
chs  ghs + ~yhs (2.19)
using the notation




With this change of notation, the only endowments that need to be specied are






2 ). These specify the value of household h's endowment (in units of
real expenditure) in each state at each date, and also indicate how the value of the
initial endowment depends on the endogenous state prices. Once this notation is
adopted, there need no longer be any reference to prices such as p1, p2, p3, ps1, ps2,
ps3 in stating the household's problem.
We can again solve equations (2.18) and (2.19) for the expenditure allocation
implied by any choice of the vector ~yh; and substitute this into the objective (2.12)
to obtain the indirect utility function















Note that with this denition, Uh(~yh) is unaected by changes in ! (considering only
the partial-equilibrium eects on a household's problem, i.e., holding xed the state
prices a).
In terms of this new notation, the collateral constraints (2.15)-(2.16) take the form
p21~y
h
2  p11~yh1   h[p12   p22]!e3 (2.21)
~yh2   h(a)!e3 (2.22)
where
(a)  a1(p12   p22)
a1p21 + a2p11
> 0 (2.23)
is a homogeneous degree zero function of the vector a. Note that (a) is a known
function given the data (p12=p11; p22=p21) that are determined by the endowments,
and p21=p11 that is determined by monetary policy.
We can then dene equilibrium more compactly as follows.
Denition 2 Given a two-state exible-price economy with homothetic preferences
E and a policy specied by (p11; p21; i; !), an equilibrium is a vector of state prices a













Figure 1: How central-bank purchases shift the set of feasible vectors ~y of intertem-
poral transfers.
(i) for each h, ~yh maximizes Uh(~yh) subject to the constraints (2.21)-(2.22); and







Once one nds equilibrium values for the state prices, the implied value of the
initial price level p1 is given by (2.10). Thus solution for the equilibrium state prices
for a given policy allows us to determine how both conventional and unconventional
monetary policy aect price level determination. If we dene the expected real rate
of return on riskless nominal assets as












then solving for p1 also allows us to solve for r. The implied value of the nominal
price of durables p3 is similarly given by (2.11); and we can also solve for the real
price of durables p3=p1.
2.3 Collateral Constraints and the Eects of Open-Market
Operations
This more compact reformulation of the model in the two-state case provides insight
into the source of the irrelevance result in Proposition 2, and into the dierence that
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binding collateral constraints should make. A simple geometrical exposition may help
to clarify the way in which central-bank asset purchases aect the set of intertemporal
expenditure allocations that are possible.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows the feasible set of intertemporal transfers y for a
given household33 as a grey region, where y1 is on the horizontal axis, and y2 on
the vertical axis. (Alternatively, Figure 1(a) shows the attainable vectors ~y for the
case of no central-bank purchases of durables, ! = 0:) Ray
 !
OA represents transfers of
purchasing power to period 1 that are possible by holding dierent amounts of money
(only);34 ray
  !
OB instead represents transfers that are possible by holding durables
(only). (Ray
  !
OB is clockwise relative to
 !
OA under the assumption that the durable
is worth more, in terms of money, in state 1 than in state 2.) Points in the region
between these two rays are attainable by holding a positive quantity of each of the
two assets.
Points in the grey region below ray
  !
OB are instead attainable only by holding a
positive quantity of durables and issuing riskless debt (collateralized by the durables).
For example, point C can be achieved by holding a quantity of durables corresponding
to vector
  !







OA, since both represent changes in the quantity of money-equivalents
held by the household.) Point C is on the lower boundary of the grey region, because  !
BC is the greatest amount of riskless debt that can be issued, given the collateral
requirement and the household's durables holdings of
  !
OB. (The vertical component
of
 !
OC is zero, indicating that this amount of collateral is just enough to allow the
debt to be repaid even in state 2. The positive horizontal component indicates that
in state 1, the collateral will be worth more than the face value of the debt.)
Figure 1(b) instead shows how the attainable set of vectors ~y shifts as a result of
central-bank purchases ! > 0: The change in the value of ~y corresponding to y = 0
(no holdings of any assets by the household, nor any borrowing) is shown by the
vector
  !
OO0. It is the sum of household h's \share" of the central bank's purchases of
the durable (a vector on the ray
  !
OB) and household h's \share" of the riskless debt
issued to nance those purchases (a vector parallel to
  !
BC). However, the quantity of
33We dispense with the superscript h in this discussion, as we discuss the budget constraints of a
single household.
34This ray is the diagonal if p11 = p21; i.e., the price level target in period 1 is independent of the
state.
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riskless liabilities issued by the central bank to nance its purchases is greater than
the maximum amount that a household would be able to issue using the durables as
collateral, since the central bank is not subject to a collateral constraint.35 Hence the
vector
  !
OO0 points clockwise relative to
 !
OC, the maximum degree of leverage possible
for a household. In fact, the ray
  !
OO0 is part of the line dened by the equation
a0~y = 0, which is downward-sloping because both state prices are positive. (O0 must
lie on this line, because the liabilities issued to nance the asset purchases have the
same market value as the durables that are purchased.)
Every value of y is mapped into a value of ~y obtained by adding to y the vector  !
OO0, so the entire attainable region (again shown as the grey region) is linearly
translated down and to the right. The indirect utility function U(~y) is not aected
by the change in !; however. The iso-utility curves can be drawn in the plane, and
remain xed as ! varies. These iso-utility curves are shown as ellipses in the gure;
in the case shown, point B represents the highest possible value of U .36
Since point B is in the interior of the grey region when ! = 0 (panel (a)), this is
the intertemporal expenditure plan that the household will choose, achieved through
the portfolio represented by vector
  !
OB. When the central bank purchases durables in
the amount indicated in panel (b), the attainable part of the plane shifts, but point
B remains in the interior of the grey region, so the household still prefers exactly the
same pattern of intertemporal expenditure (assuming no change in the state prices),
and can still achieve. However, the portfolio choice required to support this plan is no
longer represented by vector
  !
OB, but instead by
  !
O0B. Relative to the portfolio that it





O0B0; the household makes additional net trades
  !
B0B; in order
to achieve its desired intertemporal expenditure plan.37 This is the additional hedging
demand created by the central bank's purchases.
Note that the change in the household's desired portfolio
  !
B0B is exactly the ad-
ditive inverse of the vector
  !
OO0, representing the household's share h of the central
35The geometry of Figure 1 should make it clear that central-bank asset purchases can allow
a household to achieve intertemporal allocations that would not otherwise be feasible for it only
because the central bank is not subject to the same kind of collateral constraint as households.
36Point B in panel (b) need not be the same point as that labeled B in panel (a); it represents
the maximum of the indirect utility function, and need not correspond to a portfolio consisting only
of durables.
37This change in the household's portfolio is stated algebraically in (2.6){(2.7).
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bank's trades. Hence in the absence of any change in asset prices, the household
chooses to undo fraction h of the central bank's trades. If each household is in a
situation like that depicted in Figure 1(b), as assumed in Proposition 2, then the
aggregate additional trades of the households will exactly oset the central bank's
trades, and markets will continue to clear at the same prices as before. Hence the
conclusion of Proposition 2: there is no change in asset prices, no change in goods
prices, and no change in the equilibrium allocation of resources.
This result depends, however, on the assumption that each household's decision
is the one depicted in Figure 1(b): the collateral constraint does not restrict the
household's intertemporal expenditure plan, either before or after the central bank's
purchases. This need not be the case. Households might be constrained by the
collateral constraint, in either of two ways, depicted in the two panels of Figure 2.
In the case shown in Figure 2(a), the household's preferred intertemporal transfers
in the absence of central-bank purchases is shown by point D; this is not the house-
hold's unconstrained optimum, but represents the highest indierence curve that the
household can reach while remaining in the grey region. Such a household would
like to reduce expenditure in state 2 even further, by borrowing more while acquiring
durables that pay o more in state 1 than in state, but cannot because it would
violate its collateral constraint. In this case, if the central bank purchases durables,
then if asset prices do not change, the attainable region shifts as shown, and the
household's constrained optimum will now be point E. Eectively, the central bank
borrows on the household's behalf, and so relaxes the collateral constraint for such a
household.
Alternatively, a household's situation could be the one shown in Figure 2(b). In
this case, the household's preferred intertemporal transfers when ! = 0 are shown by
point F. Here again, this is not the household's unconstrained optimum; but in this
case, the collateral constraint prevents the household from increasing its expenditure
in state 2 | or more precisely, it prevents it from carrying more purchasing power
into state 2 than into state 1. In this case, if the central bank purchases durables, then
if asset prices do not change, the household's constrained optimum will now be point
G. Once again, the household does not undo the central bank's trades, owing to the
binding collateral constraint | but in this case, because it cannot. Eectively, the
household's collateral constraint is tightened in this case, rather than being relaxed.














Figure 2: Two ways in which a household's collateral constraint might bind.
relied upon to establish Proposition 2. In either case, constrained households will fail
to adjust their portfolios so as to oset their \share" of the central bank's trades,
and may adjust their portfolios little at all; the aggregate eect, if some households
are constrained while others are not, will thus typically be an excess demand for the
durable good and an excess supply of money, at unchanged asset prices. One should
then expect the central bank's purchases to raise the equilibrium price of the asset
that it purchases (the durable good), as we illustrate through both analytical and
numerical examples below.
Yet even this simple partial-equilibrium discussion should indicate that the eects
are more complex than common discussions of central-bank asset purchases assume.
First of all, there need not be eects of asset purchases on asset prices; this only
occurs when collateral is suciently scarce (relative to the degree of asymmetry in
the situations of dierent economic agents) for collateral constraints for a sucient
number of traders. Second, even when collateral constraints bind, there are a variety
of ways in which central-bank asset purchases can interact with them. The asset
purchases may eectively relax the collateral constraints, as in Figure 2(a), but they
might equally well tighten them further, as in Figure 2(b). And third, the mere fact
that the central bank's purchases succeed in raising the price of the asset (when they
do) is not necessarily informative as to whether nancial constraints are eased by the
policy. For both in Figure 2(a) and in Figure 2(b), the central bank's policy creates
excess demand for the durable at unchanged prices, and so is likely to increase the
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price of the durable. But in one case the excess demand is created by loosening the
constraint on a household's ability to hold more risk correlated with the return on
the durable, while in the other case, it is created by tightening the constraint on a
households' ability to short such risk.
It is also important to recognize that the welfare eects of the asset purchases
cannot be simply read o from these partial-equilibrium diagrams. The gures show
how a household's level of expected utility would change in each case if prices were
not to change, but in the cases where collateral constraints bind, prices must change
in order for markets to clear. The welfare eects of the price changes must be taken
into account as well, and they may outweigh the partial-equilibrium welfare eects
shown here.
For example, Figure 2(a) shows a household that achieves a higher level of ex-
pected utility as a result of central-bank purchases of the durable, if prices do not
change. But the price changes that are needed to clear markets | exactly because
of the behavior shown in the gure for the case of unchanged prices | are likely
to hurt a household in this situation. The excess demand for durables and excess
supply of money-equivalents in the case of unchanged prices should be expected to
raise the price of the durable and lower the price for which riskless debt can be issued;
but since this household issues riskless debt and acquires durables in order to satisfy
the collateral requirement for such issues, such price changes are likely to reduce the
budget of the household shown in the gure. We show explicitly in the next section
that because of such price eects, it is possible for the welfare of a household in the
situation shown in Figure 2(a) to be reduced.38
3 Eects of Asset Purchases When Leverage
Constraints Bind
A full consideration of the eects of central-bank asset purchases requires that we
go beyond the partial-equilibrium analysis presented above, and also consider the
endogenous price changes that result, in general, when collateral constraints bind
for at least some households. To keep the calculations tractable, we now further
specialize our analysis to a still more restrictive class of preferences, in which the
38See Figure 3 below, and discussion in section 3.3.
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indirect utility functions ~u; ~us are such that
~u0(c) = c ; ~u0s(c) = sc
  (3.1)
for some coecients ; 1; 2;  > 0:
39 This assumption implies that the indirect
utility function Uh dened in (2.12) will also be a homothetic function of (ch; ch1 ; c
h
2).
(From now on, when we assume that households have \homothetic preferences," we
should be understood to refer to this stronger version of the assumption.)
We also restrict attention in this section to equilibria of a particular type: ones in
which the collateral constraint of each households either binds in the way shown in
Figure 2(a), or does not bind at all. We focus on the situation in which the collateral
constraints bind in the way shown in Figure 2(a) | that is, in which constraint (2.22)
binds rather than (2.21) | because, as shown in the gure, this is the case in which
the asset purchases would increase the welfare of the constrained households in the
absence of asset-price changes. The case in which the constrained households are
leveraged households | who wish to borrow more in order to acquire even more of
the risky durable, but are unable to owing to the collateral constraint | is also of
particular interest because authors such as Adrian and Shin (2010) and Geanakoplos
(2010) emphasize, in their models of the role of nancial constraints in asset pricing,
the role of variations in degree to which the \natural buyers" of risky assets are able
to leverage themselves in order to acquire as much of these assets as they would like.
It is not possible, however, for constraint (2.22) to bind for everyone. For if (2.22)
binds, the household chooses a portfolio that transfers no income to state 2 in period
1 (yh2 = 0); such a household must issue the maximum quantity of debt allowed
by the collateral requirement given its holdings of durables, and hold no money or
money-equivalents. But everyone cannot issue debt while no one chooses to hold
such assets. (And there must be a positive aggregate capacity to issue debt, since
households in aggregate must hold a positive quantity of durables, as long as ! < 1:)
Hence in the case of only two types, we consider equilibria in which one household
is constrained, and one not. We rst consider the conditions required for such an
equilibrium, and then ask, when these conditions are satised, what the eects of
increased central-bank holdings of durables will be.
39Note that both our previous assumption of homotheticity of the period utility functions and this
assumption would follow from an assumption that u(x1; x2) = (1   ) 1(x1 1 + x1 2 ) for some
 > 0; though our assumptions remain more general than simply assuming this familiar case.
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3.1 Equilibrium When Only the Leverage Constraint Binds
We rst note some general properties of collateral-constrained equilibria in which
only constraint (2.22) binds (on some households), while constraint (2.21) binds for
no one. These results do not depend on the restriction to an economy with only
two household types, though they do rely upon our strengthening of the assumption
about the form of preferences.
The fact that constraint (2.21) does not bind implies that in equilibrium, Uh1 = 0
for all h 2 H, where we use the notation Uhs for the partial derivative of the indirect
utility function Uh dened in (2.20) with respect to ~yhs ; evaluated for the equilibrium






for all h 2 H: Assumption (3.1) then implies that the expenditure ratio ch1=ch must be
the same for all households. But the aggregate expenditure ratio must equal the ratio
of the values of the aggregate endowments in the two states; hence the expenditure
ratio for each household must equal the ratio of the endowments. This allows us to
determine each household's marginal rate of substitution, and hence the equilibrium
value of a1: We thus obtain the following result.
Lemma 3 In a exible-price economy with homothetic preferences and two states in
period 1, if an equilibrium exists in which constraint (2.21) does not bind for any

















11: Thus the state price a1 will be unaected by pol-
icy (either conventional or unconventional monetary policy), to the extent that the
variation in policy does not change the fact that constraints (2.21) do not bind.
This simple result is already enough to allow us to establish some useful conclu-
sions about the possible eects of monetary policy on asset prices. By analogy with
(2.25), let us dene the expected real return on the durable rdur as40
















40Here we treat the cost of investment in a unit of this asset as p3   p2, i.e., the cost of a unit of
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and the spread between the expected returns on the durable and on riskless debt as




where r is dened in (2.25).
Proposition 4 In a exible-price economy with homothetic preferences and two states
in period 1, suppose that for any policy in some set under consideration, an equi-
librium exists in which constraint (2.21) does not bind for any household, though
constraint (2.22) may bind for some. Suppose also that the period 1 price-level com-
mitments fps1gs2S are the same for all policies in the set. Then if any policy change
(whether in interest-rate policy or in the central bank's asset purchases) raises (low-
ers) the real price of the durable p3=p1 in period 0 must also lower (raise) the expected
real return on riskless debt r; and while it also lowers (raises) the expected real return
rdur on the durable, it increases (decreases) the spread r^dur   r^:
Suppose further that only the central bank's asset-purchase policy is changed, while
the interest-rate target i remains xed. Then a policy that raises (lowers) the real price
of the durable in period 0 must lower (raise) the general price level in period 0 (i.e.,
the money prices of both non-durables and rental of the services of durables). More-
over, the general price level must fall (rise) by a greater amount, in percentage terms,
than the increase (decrease) in the real price of durables, so that the nominal price
of the durable good in period 0 must also fall (rise). Thus an asset-purchase policy
that increases (decreases) the nominal price of the durable in period 0 must increase
(decrease) the equilibrium real return r on riskless nominal debt, reduce (increase) the
size of the spread r^dur   r^ between the expected real returns on durables and those on
riskless debt, and increase (decrease) aggregate nominal expenditure on goods and ser-
vices, resulting (in our exible-price endowment economy) in an increase (decrease)
in the general level of prices.
Proof. By Lemma 3, the equilibrium state price a1 must be the same for all policies
for the set under consideration, and by hypothesis p11; p21 are the same under all
the durable after it has already been rented in period 0, or alternatively, the purchase price prior to
rental, net of the amount that the buyer can obtain back in period 0 by renting the durable. In this
way, rdur is the return that would have to equal r in an economy with risk-neutral investors and no
nancial frictions that prevent arbitrage between the two assets.
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policies as well. We have shown earlier that (under the assumption of homothetic
preferences) p2=p1; p12=p11 and p22=p21 are independent of policy as well. It then
follows from (2.11) that the real price of durables can be changed by one of the policies
under consideration if and only if the state price a2 changes, and more specically that
p3=p1 increases if and only if a2 increases as a result of the policy change. Moreover,
1 + rdur must vary inversely with (p3   p2)=p1; so that rdur falls if and only if a2
increases.
Similarly, (2.10) implies that the quantity (1 + i)p1 can be changed if and only if
a2 changes, and more specically that (1+ i)p1 falls if and only if a2 increases. It then
follows from (2.25) that r similarly falls if and only if a2 increases. Thus the expected
real returns on both the risky durable and on riskless debt must fall if and only if a2
increases. We can furthermore sign the dierence between the percentage changes in
























where C is a positive constant (a function only of the prices fpslg that are independent
of policy). It follows from this that (1 + rdur)=(1 + r) is an increasing function of a2
(holding xed a1 and the fpslg). Hence the spread r^dur   r^ increases if and only if a2
increases. Since a2 increases if and only if p3=p1 increases, the assertions in the rst
paragraph of the lemma have all been established.
In the case that there is no change in i, a decline in (1 + i)p1 necessarily requires
a decline (in the same proportion) in p1 (and hence in p2 as well, since p2=p1 is
independent of policy). As shown above, an increase in a2 necessarily implies a
decrease in (1 + i)p1 (and hence in p1) by a factor that is larger than the factor by





decreases if and only if a2 increases. Hence p3   p2 decreases, and since p2 also
decreases, it follows a fortiori that p3 decreases, if and only if a2 increases. Thus an
asset-purchase policy that raises the nominal price of the durable in period 0 (whether
one considers the pre-rental price p3 or the post-rental price p3 p2) must be one that
lowers a2, from which the conclusions stated in the second paragraph of the lemma
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then follow. 
Thus to the extent that an asset-purchase policy is able to raise the nominal price
of the asset purchased by the central bank, consequences necessarily follow for both
the equilibrium real returns on other assets, and for aggregate nominal spending. This
suggests that the concern of central banks with policies intended to raise the prices of
particular assets, as a way of inuencing macroeconomic conditions more generally,
is not misguided. However, it is worth noting that the eects allowed by Proposition
4 are rather dierent than those implied by the \portfolio balance" theory typically
relied upon by central banks as a theory of these policies.
According to the \portfolio balance" theory, the central bank's purchase of assets
that are more exposed to a particular type of risk than are assets in general | in
this case, the risk of a low return in state 2, the state in which the return on durables
is relatively low compared to that on money, and hence to that on the economy's
aggregate portfolio as well | should lower the market risk premium associated with
that type of risk, and hence lower the risk premium for holding the type of assets
purchased by the central bank. It is generally supposed that this reduction in the risk
premium should also reduce the expected real return on the risky asset purchased by
the central bank, since there is less reason for the riskless real rate to be inuenced
by the purchase of risky assets; and it is this reduction in the expected real return
on risky assets that is relied upon to increase aggregate demand.
It remains to be analyzed whether asset purchases by the central bank should
indeed reduce the risk premium associated with the assets purchased; below, we give
conditions under which this will be true, though they are not as general as might be
expected. But even granting that they do, it is already evident from Proposition 4
that the conventional story does not match what happens in our model. An asset-
purchase policy that reduces the spread r^dur r^ would have to reduce a2; such a policy
would indeed reduce aggregate nominal expenditure, according to the proposition, but
it would be associated with an increase rather than a decrease in the expected real
return rdur on the risky asset, and a decrease rather than an increase in the asset's
real price. Thus the conventional account would not be correct, either about the
implications of the reduction in the spread for the expected real return on the risky
asset purchased by the central bank, or about the role of this return in explaining
the eects on aggregate demand.
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In order to consider how central-bank asset purchases should aect a2 (and hence
the asset prices and returns just discussed), it is useful to further simplify our def-
inition of equilibrium for the special case under consideration. The result that the
expenditure ratio ch1=c
h must be the same for each household means that we can
solve for both ch and ch1 for any household, as a function of the total present value of
expenditure
ch01  ch + a1ch1
allocated to period 0 and state 1 of period 1. Hence we can write the total contribution







as a function of ch01: Let this function be denoted (1=2)~u01(c
h
01): Note that it will be
the same function for each household, and will have the property that ~u0(c) = 01c 
for some constant 01 > 0:
We can then write each household's preferences over the remaining dimension of
the intertemporal allocation of expenditure | shifting expenditure between state 2












Note that this function can be dened independently of the value of a2 (the relative
price of these remaining two components of expenditure).
Finally, in any equilibrium of this kind, a household's expenditure in state 1 of



















s ; for all h and s. Constraint (2.21) can alter-
natively be written in the form
p21c
h
2  p11ch1 + (p21eh21   p11eh11)  h(p12   p22)!e3;
so that the condition required for the allocation (ch01; c
h
2) to be consistent with our
assumption that constraint (2.21) does not bind is
p21c
h
2  p11ch01 + (p21eh21   p11eh11)  h(p12   p22)!e3: (3.3)
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We can then state necessary and sucient conditions for an equilibrium in which
constraint (2.21) binds for no households.





of the h 2 H describe an equilibrium in which the short-sale constraint (2.21) binds
for no households if
(i) for each h 2 H; the plan (ch01; ch2) maximizes the indirect utility function Uh
dened in (3.2), subject to the constraints that
ch01 + a2c
h
2  eh + a1kh1 + a2kh2 ; (3.4)
ch2  gh2   h(a2)!e3; (3.5)








(iii) inequality (3.3) is satised for each h 2 H:
In this statement of the household's problem, (3.4) is the intertemporal budget con-
straint implied by the set of period budget constraints (2.18){(2.19), and (3.5) is an
alternative expression of the leverage constraint (2.22), with both constraints now
written in terms of the expenditure allocation (ch01; c
h
2): (In condition (3.5), the func-
tion (a2) is simply the function (a) dened earlier, in which the value a1 dened
in Lemma 3 has been substituted for a1.) Condition (ii) is the condition for market-
clearing in state 2 of period 1; we need not add a corresponding market-clearing
relation for aggregate expenditure in the initial period and in state 1, as this is guar-
anteed by condition (ii) and Walras' Law. This alternative statement of the conditions
required for an equilibrium is useful in determining the eects of central-bank asset
purchases on the equilibrium value of a2, and hence on the other asset prices and
expected returns discussed above.
It will also be useful to consider a modied equilibrium concept, in which con-
straints (3.3) are ignored.
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Denition 4 An equilibrium neglecting short-sale constraints is a state price a2 and
intertemporal expenditure plans (ch01; c
h
2) for each of the h 2 H such that
(i) for each h 2 H; the plan (ch01; ch2) maximizes the indirect utility function Uh
subject to constraints (3.4){(3.5); and
(ii) condition (3.6) holds.
This can be thought of as an equilibrium of a model in which short sales of the durable
are allowed, though issuance of riskless debt is still constrained by the collateral
requirement; and when a household chooses a short position in the durable, it is
required to hold a minimum quantity of money or money-equivalents, 1=C2 units for
each unit of the durable that is sold short. The interest of the concept, however, is that
the set of equilibria neglecting short-sale constraints can be more easily characterized
than the set of equilibria of the model with collateral constraints set out above. The
equilibria of the model with collateral constraints in which constraint (2.21) binds
for no household are then equivalent to the set of equilibria neglecting short-sale
constraints for which (in addition to the equilibrium requirements) inequality (3.3) is
satised for all households.
3.2 Eects of Asset Purchases with One Constrained
Household
Explicit calculations of the eects of central-bank asset purchases are especially simple
if we further restrict ourselves to the case of an economy made up of households of
only two types (h = 1; 2), assumed to exist in equal numbers. Note that there is no
loss of generality in assuming that the number of households of the two types are
equal since, in the case of homothetic preferences, the only thing that matters for
equilibrium is the share of the aggregate endowment of each good that is controlled
by households of a given type, and not the number of households among whom the
endowment is divided. Thus when we refer to parameters such as e13=e
2
3; they should
be understood to specify the relative quantities owned by households of the two types
in aggregate, and not the relative size of the endowments of individuals.
In the case of only two households, the possible equilibrium allocations of expendi-







Figure 3: Equilibria in the case of two households and two states, shown in an
Edgeworth Box diagram. The equilibrium at E2 corresponds to a larger central-bank
balance sheet.
Edgeworth Box diagram. In Figure 3, the allocation between the two households of ex-
penditure in the initial period and in state 1 is indicated on the horizontal axis: move-
ment to the right indicates an increasing value of c101; and a corresponding decreasing








quantity independent of policy. Similarly, the allocation between the two households
of expenditure in state 2 of period 1 is indicated on the vertical axis: movement
upward indicates an increasing value of c12; and a corresponding decreasing value of




2 ; a quantity that is also independent of policy.
The preferences of each household can be depicted by indierence curves in the
plane, representing the level curves of the indirect utility function Uh dened in (3.2).
In the gure, the indierence curves of household 1 are the ones that are concave
upward, and indierence curves that are higher and farther to the right represent
higher expected utility for this household. The indierence curves of household 2
are the ones that are concave downward, and indierence curves that are lower and
farther to the left represent higher expected utility for household 2.
The budget constraint (3.4) can be represented by a straight line with slope 1=a2;








2 for each household. The location of this point is also unaected
by changes in a2 or the central bank's balance sheet.
41 A household for which the
leverage constraint (3.5) does not bind must choose an expenditure plan on this line
where the line is tangent to one of its indierence curves. A household for which the
leverage constraint binds, instead, must choose the point on the line which reaches
the highest indierence curve that is attainable given the lower bound on ch2 implied
by the leverage constraint.
An equilibrium in which the leverage constraint binds for neither type must cor-
respond to point E2 in Figure 3, as this is the unique point with the property that (i)
the indierence curves of the two types are tangent to each other at this point, and
(ii) the common tangent line to the two indierence curves passes through point A.
(It corresponds to the A-D equilibrium of this economy, which can easily be shown to
be unique given our assumption of homothetic preferences.) Point E2 will represent
an equilibrium neglecting short-sale constraints if when a2 has the value implied by
the slope of the budget line through point E2; constraints (3.5) are satised for both
households.42 Specically, the lower bound for c12 must correspond to a vertical height
somewhere below point E2, while the lower bound for c
2
2 must correspond to a vertical
height somewhere higher than point E2: Since these constraints depend on the value
of !; this condition may be satised for some values of ! but not for others.
An equilibrium in which the leverage constraint binds for household 2 only is
illustrated by point E1 in Figure 3. At this point, household 1's indierence curve is
tangent to the budget line passing through the point, so this represents an allocation
that household 1 would choose (if a2 takes the value implied by the slope of the budget
line) if not constrained by its leverage constraint. Household 2, instead, would prefer
to move up and to the left on the budget line, as it could reach higher indierence
curves in that case. However, point E1 can be a constrained optimum for household
2, if its leverage constraint requires c22 to be no lower than the value corresponding to
point E1: Thus point E1 represents an equilibrium neglecting short-sale constraints,
if the leverage constraints imply a lower bound for c12 somewhere below the value
corresponding to the vertical height of point E1, while they imply a lower bound for
c22 exactly equal to the corresponding to the vertical height of E1: Since the heights
41It may be aected by changes in interest-rate policy, as discussed further below.
42It will also be an equilibrium of the model with collateral constraints if, in addition, constraint
(3.3) is satised for both households.
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of these lower bounds depend on !; there will be at most one precise value of ! for
which point E1 will be an equilibrium. The value of ! that is required is the unique
value that causes (3.5) to hold with equality at the allocation represented by point
E1:
We can now consider how central-bank asset purchases can aect the location
of the equilibrium in this diagram, assuming a xed value for i. For any value of




2(a2)) be the plan for household 1 that maximizes U
1 subject
to constraint (3.4). These functions parametrically dene a curve in the Edgeworth
Box, household 1's \oer curve." This curve passes through points E1 and E2 (in the
case shown in the gure), as well as through point A. The value of a2 for which the
















where  1=a2 is also the slope of the line
  !
AE2 in the gure.
Generically, the A-D equilibrium is not at the endowment point A, and if so, the
slopes of the indierence curves of the two types through point A will be unequal;
moreover, one must have an indierence curve steeper than
  !
AE2, and the other an







so that household 1 has the atter indierence curve through point A. Then the
value of a2 for which household 1's oer curve passes through the endowment point











Moreover, c12  c^12(a2); household 1's expenditure in state 2 in the A-D equilibrium,
will necessarily be greater than k12; as also shown in the gure. We can then establish
the following general result about equilibria neglecting short-sale constraints.
Proposition 5 Consider a model with two states in period 1, and two types of house-
holds with homothetic preferences, where household 1 is identied by the inequality
(3.7), and let the value of i  0 be xed. Then for any value of c12 in the interval
k12  c12  c12 ; (3.8)
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there is a unique value of a2 in the interval a

2  a2  a2 such that c^12(a2) = c12: If in
addition these values (c12; a2) satisfy the bounds













then there exists an asset-purchase policy 0  ! < 1 for which the point on household
1's oer curve corresponding to the values (c12; a2) represents an equilibrium neglecting
short-sale constraints, in which household 2's borrowing is constrained by the leverage
constraint (3.5), except in the limiting case in which c12 = c
1
2 ; but household 1 is
unconstrained.
In the case of any c12 < c
1
2 ; the unique value of ! consistent with this equilibrium
is




while for the case c12 = c
1
2 ; any value of ! in the interval [!^(c
1
2 ); 1) is consistent with
the equilibrium. The value of a2 associated with each of these possible equilibria is a
monotonically decreasing function of c12: Moreover, a higher value of c
1
2 is associated
with a lower value of the real price p3=p1 for the durable, with the consequences for
other asset prices and rates of return stated in Proposition 4.
Proof. It follows from standard properties of oer curves that for all values a2 < a

2 ;
the points on the oer curve will involve c12 > k
1
2; and that c^
1
2(a2) is a monotonically
decreasing function over this range, increasing without bound as a2 ! 0, Instead, for
values a2 > a

2 ; the function need not be monotonic, but necessarily all points on this
part of the oer curve involve c12 < k
1
2: Hence for any value c
1
2  k12; there is a unique
0 < a2 < a





2; and the required value of a2 is monotonically
decreasing as a function of c12.
Moreover, assumption (3.7) implies that the indierence curve of household 2
through the endowment point A is steeper than that of household 1. Because the
A-D equilibrium is unique, there can be only one point on the oer curve at which
the slopes of the indierence curves are identical (namely, point E2, corresponding to
the A-D equilibrium), so for all values of a2 in the interval a

2 < a2  a2 ; the slope
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of the indierence curve of household 2 is more negative than  1=a2 at the point on
the oer curve corresponding to a2; and when a2 = a

2; the slope is exactly  1=a2:
Hence for any value of c12 in the interval (3.8), there is a unique point on the
oer curve, corresponding to a value of a2 in the interval a

2  a2  a2 , for which
c^12(a2) = c
1
2: This corresponds to an allocation in which household 1's expenditure
plan is optimal, given the budget line dened by a2; thus it will solve the problem
for household 1 dened in condition (i) of Denition 4, as long as the lower bound





2's expenditure plan is also optimal, given the budget line; thus it will solve the
problem dened in condition (i) as well, as long as the lower bound dened by (3.5)




2   c12: If instead
c12 < c
1
2 ; household 2 has an indierence curve through this point that is steeper than
the budget line. This implies that household 2's plan is optimal among all those on




2   c12: Thus household
2's plan solves the problem dened in condition (i) if and only if the lower bound





This point on the oer curve, together with the associated value of a2; accordingly
constitutes an equilibrium neglecting short-sale constraints only if the lower bound




2   c12; if c12 < c12 : This requires that
g22   2(a2)!e3 =
X
h
kh2   c12; (3.11)
which requires that ! = !^(c12); the value dened in (3.10). This is a feasible policy
only if 0  !^(c12) < 1; which is true if and only if the bounds (3.9) are satised. In
the case that c12 = c
1







2   c12, which requirement is satised if and only if !  !^(c12 ): This
denes a non-empty interval of feasible values for ! if the bounds (3.9) are satised
(though actually only the upper bound in (3.9) is necessary in this case).
Thus any such point on the oer curve satises all of the conditions to be an
equilibrium neglecting short-sale constraints, in the case of an asset-purchase policy
of the kind dened in the proposition, as long as the lower bound for c12 dened by
(3.5) for household 1 is no higher than the assumed value of c12. This requires that
inequality (3.5) be satised by the proposed values of c12; a2; and !: But the fact that
(3.11) holds when ! = !^(c12) implies that (3.5) holds as well (and is a strict inequality);
this is just the observation already made earlier, that it is not possible for the leverage
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constraint (3.5) to simultaneously bind for both households. Moreover, the fact that
the lower bound dened in (3.5) is a monotonically decreasing function of ! implies
that (3.5) must also be satised in the case of any !  !^(c12): Hence all conditions for
an equilibrium neglecting short-sale constraints, as dened in Denition 4, are shown
to be satised.
It has already been noted in the above derivation that the implied value of a2 is
a monotonically decreasing function of c12: The fact that this then implies that the
equilibrium value of p3=p1 will be a monotonically decreasing function of c
1
2 follows
from the discussion in the proof of Proposition 4. 
This result establishes conditions under which there will exist a continuum of
distinct real allocations of resources, each of which corresponds to an equilibrium
neglecting short-sale constraints under an appropriate choice of !: (Only one of these,
however, corresponds to an equilibrium in which the leverage constraints do not
bind for either household; thus the possibility of obtaining dierent real allocations
and dierent equilibrium asset prices through variation in the central bank's asset
purchases depends on the fact that the leverage constraint binds for household 2.)
These will also correspond to distinct possible equilibria of the model with collateral
constraints, as long as the additional inequality constraints (3.3) do not bind. This
must be checked in addition to the conditions stated in Proposition 5; but since these
are inequalities, it is possible for a non-empty interval of values of c12 to satisfy both
of them, as we verify through numerical examples below.
Under somewhat stronger assumptions, we can sign the relationship between the
change in the central bank's balance sheet and the changes in the endogenous variables
that are related to one another in Proposition 5.
Lemma 4 If preferences are of the form (3.1) with   1; then the value of ! dened
by (3.10) is an increasing function of c12.
Proof. The oer curve of household 1 consists of the values (c101; c
1











and budget constraint 3.4) with equality, for any value of a2: Using (3.12) to substitute




point where c12 > k
1















Here the inequality (3.13) relies upon the assumptions that c12 > k
1
2 and   1: Note
that 1a2;c2 < 0 as well.













   1  20(a2)[a21a2;c2=c12]!e3







Here the inequality uses the fact that the denition (2.23) implies that
 (a2) < 0(a2)a2 < 0;
and inequality (3.13); the next equality follows from the fact that (3.5) holds with
equality for houssehold 2; and the nal equality follows from the market-clearing
relation (3.6). The nal inequality then follows from the fact that f22 > 0 and the
assumption that c12 > k
1
2: It then follows from (3.14) that ! is an increasing function
of c12: 
In this case, over the range of values for c12 satisfying the hypotheses of Proposition
5, increases in central-bank holdings of the durable are associated with relaxations of
the leverage constraint of the constrained household (household 2) | i.e., a reduction
of the lower bound for c22 | as in the partial-equilibrium analysis shown in Figure
2(a). Hence increasing ! results in a movement up the oer curve (away from the
endowment point A and toward the Pareto-optimal equilibrium E2), which must be
associated with a decrease in a2.
In such a case, we can give a clear answer to our questions about the eects of
central-bank purchases on both asset prices and goods prices. If ! is increased while
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i is held constant, then | over the range of variation in ! for which an equilibrium
exists in which constraints (3.3) do not bind | a2 must fall. Proposition 4 then
implies that the real price of the durable p3=p1 falls, while its nominal price p3 rises;
that the expected return rdur rises, along with the expected return r on riskless debt,
but that the spread r^dur   r^ decreased; and that the money prices of goods and
services in period 0 increase, so that aggregate nominal expenditure in period 0 also
increases.
3.3 Welfare Consequences of Asset Purchases
We have shown in the previous section that under certain conditions, central-bank
purchases of the durable have a variety of eects on real and nominal variables. This
means that this dimension of policy is not irrelevant, under circumstances where
the leverage constraints of some economic agents bind in equilibrium. Moreover,
our results show that the eects of asset-purchase policy are distinct from those of
interest-rate policy. For example, if conventional monetary policy is accompanied by
the kind of scal transfers assumed in Proposition 1, then changes in i have no eect
on any real variables or relative prices, and only change the general level of prices
in period 0. Our results above show, instead, that under certain conditions, central-
bank asset purchases change a variety of relative prices and real rates of return,
in addition to their eects on the prices of goods and services in period 0. Since
our calculations above were all conducted under the assumption of a xed value for
(1 + i)m; they would be unaected by the assumption of a scal rule of the kind
posited in Proposition 1.
But in judging how best to use this additional dimension of policy, it is important
to consider not merely whether asset prices are aected, by how these price changes
aect the welfare of economic agents. In fact, the mere fact that central-bank pur-
chases of the durable can loosen a household's leverage constraint does not always
imply that the household benets from such a policy. Consider the shift from equilib-
rium E1 to equilibrium E2 in Figure 3, which results from an increase in central-bank
holdings of the durable (under the assumption made in Lemma 4), that reduces the
lower bound on c22 for household 2. In this example, household 2 is the one whose
collateral constraint binds in equilibrium, and the constraint is relaxed | indeed, it
ceases to bind, if purchases are sucient to shift the equilibrium all the way to point
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E2: In the absence of any price changes, the situation of household 2 would be the one
depicted in Figure 2(a), and the household would clearly benet. But in fact, in the
case shown in Figure 3, the expected utility of household 2 is reduced by the policy.
This results from the adverse eect on household 2 of the price changes resulting from
the policy: these leveraged investors suer an income loss when the real market price
of the debt that they issue falls by more than does the real market price of the risky
assets that they purchase, and this loss more than osets the gain from relaxation of
the leverage constraint.
On the other hand, household 1 benets from the policy change, in the case
shown in Figure 3, even though household 1's collateral constraint does not bind.
The income eect of the price changes is positive for household 1, for the same reason
that it is negative for household 2. One's conclusion about the desirability of the
policy change will therefore depend on the relative weight placed on the welfare of
households in the two situations.
In fact, the eects of central-bank asset purchases on the welfare of the constrained
household depend on how sharply this household is constrained by its leverage con-
straint; that is, on how close the equilibrium allocation is to the A-D allocation (the
allocation in the limiting case in which the leverage constraint no longer binds).
Proposition 6 In any equilibrium neglecting short-sale constraints of the kind de-
scribed in Proposition 5, the expected utility of household h is given by U^h(c12); the
value of the function Uh dened in (3.2) evaluated at the point in the Edgeworth
Box that is the unique point on the oer curve of household 1 with this value of
c12. The function U^
1(c12) is a monotonically increasing function of c
1
2 over the entire
range (3.8); thus if asset purchases by the central bank relax the leverage constraint
of household 2 (as under the hypothesis of Lemma 4), raising the equilibrium value of
c12; they necessarily increase the welfare of household 1. The function U^
2(c12); instead,
is non-monotonic. In particular, it is necessarily monotonically increasing for values
of c12 close enough to k
1
2; but monotonically decreasing for values of c
1
2 close enough to
c12 : Over the entire range (3.8), it is on average increasing, since U^
2(c12 ) > U^
2(k12):
Proof. As explained in the proof of Proposition 5, equilibria neglecting short-sale
constraints corresponding to values of c12 in the interval (3.8) involve allocations on
the oer curve of household 1, for budget lines corresponding to state prices in the
interval a2  a2  a2 ; moreover, higher values of c12 correspond to lower values of
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a2 (steeper budget lines). For any value of c
1
2 in the interval (3.8), the point on the
oer curve is a point on the budget line above and to the left of the endowment
point A. It then follows that a decrease in a2 (steepening the budget line through
point A) rotates the budget line so that the point previously preferred by household 1
(indeed, all points on the previous budget line above and to the left of A) is now in the
interior of household 1's budget set, so that a point that household 1 strictly prefers
is now attainable. Hence the expected utility of household 1 must be monotonically
increasing as one moves up the oer curve, so that U^1 is a monotonically increasing
function of c12.
The function U^2(c12) is obtained by evaluating the expected utility of household 2
as one moves up the oer curve of household 1. For values of c12 close enough to k
1
2;
the oer curve passes through the endowment point A with a slope of  1=2a; the
slope of the indierence curve of household 1 through point A. The indierence curve
of household 2 through point A is steeper, as noted earlier, as a consequence of (3.7).
Hence near point A, the oer curve moves up and to the left from point A with a
slope atter than the indierence curve of household 2, so that the expected utility of
household 2 is increasing as one moves up the oer curve. Hence U^2(c12) must be an
increasing function for values of c12 close enough to k
1
2: On the other hand, the oer
curve must approach the A-D allocation (point E2 in Figure 3) from below, from a
direction that is to the left of the line
  !
AE2, and therefore from the interior of the
set of points that household 2 prefers to point E2 (a set bounded by the indierence
curve of household 2 passing through E2, which is tangent to the line
  !
AE2). Hence
the expected utility of household 2 is necessarily decreasing as one moves up the oer
curve, at least from initial values close enough to the A-D allocation. Thus U^2(c12)
must be a decreasing function of c12 for all values of c
1
2 close enough to c
1
2 : Finally,
the total change in the value of U^2(c12) as one moves up the oer curve from the
endowment point to the A-D allocation must be positive, since the endowment point
A is also a point on the budget line
  !
AE2 associated with the A-D equilibrium, and
household 2 must strictly prefer point E2 to this point, as shown in Figure 3. 
This result shows that the fact that in Figure 3, household 2 is harmed by the
policy that relaxes its leverage constraint, is no error in the drafting of the gure;
this is necessarily the case if the asset-purchase policy moves the economy to the A-D







Figure 4: Another example of equilibria in the case of two households and two states,
showing the possibility of a Pareto improvement as a result of central-bank asset
purchases.
leverage constraint binds. However, the proposition also implies that it is possible
for an increase in the central bank's holdings of the durable to increase the welfare
of both types of households. This possibility is illustrated graphically in Figure 4. In
this gure, central-bank purchases of the durable again reduce the lower bound for c22
implied by household 2's leverage constraint (3.5), but not by enough for household
2's leverage constraint to cease to bind. In the case shown, equilibrium E2 is strictly
preferred by both households to the original equilibrium E1; hence there is a clear
benet from central-bank asset purchases in this case. This result depends on the
indierence curves of household 2 being a good deal steeper than those of household
1, in both equilibria; in other words, the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
leverage constraint for household 2 is substantial.
Figure 4 only illustrates the possibility of a Pareto improvement to the extent that
the equilibria neglecting short-sale constraints shown in the Figure are actually equi-
libria of the model with collateral constraints; that is, that the short-sale constraints
(3.3) are satised for both households in the allocations corresponding to both points
E1 and E2. We show through numerical examples in the next section that this can
be the case.
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4 Distortions Resulting from Central-Bank
Monopolization of Collateral
In the previous section, we have emphasized the possibility of equilibria in which the
collateral constraints bind for some households in the way shown in Figure 2(a) |
what we have called a binding leverage constraint | rather than binding in the way
shown in Figure 2(b), the case of a binding short-sale constraint. This does not mean,
however, that the short-sale constraint cannot also be relevant in equilibrium; our
numerical examples below show that either or both of the two types of constraints may
bind, depending on parameter values. Indeed, it is worth remarking that suciently
large asset purchases by the central bank will almost certainly create a situation in
which many households are constrained in the way shown in Figure 2(b).
When ! approaches 1, so that most of the durable is held by the central bank, equi-
librium will necessarily involve many households holding more money than durables,
so that they will be at a position not far from the upper boundary of the grey region
shown in Figures 1 and 2. (Recall that the upper boundary corresponds to port-
folios made up solely of riskless assets.) Equilibrium will require asset prices that
lead households to choose points in that region; and assuming some degree of hetero-
geneity in the endowment patters of the dierent households, it will almost certainly
be the case that many households are driven entirely to the boundary (so that they
would like to short the durable, at the equilibrium prices, but are unable to), while
the (now very expensive) durable is held only by those households with the greatest
desire to shift more income into state 1 than into state 2. Hence except in very special
cases (such as the one assumed in Proposition 3), as ! ! 1; one will eventually have
an equilibrium in which the short-sale constraint binds for many households, while
none may be constrained in the way shown in Figure 2(a).
This will mean that while the central bank will still be able to further increase the
price of the durable by purchasing more of it, these eects will surely be achieved by
tightening traders' nancial constraints, rather than relaxing them. Moreover, this
tightening of nancial constraints will necessarily reduce welfare for many (though
not necessarily all) households. If nearly all collateral is held by the central bank,
risk-sharing between households ceases to be possible, as does borrowing; households
can only obtain an expenditure pattern dierent from that determined by their en-
dowments by accumulating non-negative money balances. In addition to preventing
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mutually benecial trades, the fact that the policy raises the price of the durable
good redistributes period 0 income from households with shares of the aggregate en-
dowment of durables less than h to households with shares greater than h: The
latter benet from this redistribution, but the former are hurt. Thus central-bank
asset purchases on too large a scale will necessarily have signicant costs, owing to
the impairment of the functioning of nancial markets that predictably results from
an induced scarcity of collateral.
We illustrate this point with numerical examples. In each of the examples, there
are two states in period 1, and the economy has two types of household h = 1; 2; each












Note that preferences of this form are both homothetic in the sense assumed in section
2.2 and thereafter, and satisfy the additional restriction (3.1), for the value  = 1:
This value of  also satises the stronger hypothesis of Lemma 4, so that all of our
analytical results above to the examples considered in this section.
4.1 Relevant Dimensions of Variation in Endowment
Patterns: The Log Utility Case
In our numerical examples, we consider not only the eects of variation in ! on
the various endogenous variables, holding xed the other exogenous parameters, but
also the way in which the nature of equilibrium, and the corresponding eects of
unconventional policy, vary as a result of changes in the assumed endowment patterns
of the households. An advantage of the log utility specication (4.1) is that in this
case, the properties of the equilibria of interest do not depend on the aggregate
endowments of the dierent goods at the dierent dates and in dierent states, but
only upon the shares of the aggregate endowment of each type that are held by each
of the household types. This reduces the number of parameters that need to be varied
in order to explore all of the ways in which alternative endowment patterns can result
in dierent types of equilibria.
















(s = 1; 2)
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for each of the households h; feasibility requires that these each be non-negative, and














indicating the tax revenues that must be raised in period 1 to redeem the money
endowment of household h, inclusive of the interest paid on it, as a share of the value
of the economy's aggregate endowment in state 2 (the state in which durables are
less valuable). Then we can establish the following equivalence result.
Lemma 5 Let E and E 0 be two economies, in each of which each household has
preferences of the form (4.1). Suppose furthermore that the values of the share pa-
rameters fsh1 ; sh3 ; shs1; shm; hg are the same for both economies, and that the price ratio
















h and the future price-level commitments ps1
may be dierent in the two economies.) Then for any value of ! and any equilib-
rium of economy E associated with this policy, there is a corresponding equilibrium of





















are the same, the normalized intertemporal transfers43
y^hs 




are the same, and the normalized state prices44































44Here we again use the notation eh  eh1 + (p2=p1)eh3 for the value of the household's \total
non-durable endowment" in period 0.
62
will be the same in the corresponding equilibria of the two economies, as will be the










Hence conclusions about the eects of varying !, both on the period 0 price level
(and aggregate nominal expenditure) and on the equilibrium price (both nominal and
real) of the durable asset, will be the same (in percentage terms) for both economies.
Moreover, if the utility of household h in the equilibrium of economy E is Uh, then
the utility of that household in the equilibrium of economy E 0 is Uh + h; where the
constant h depends only on the aggregate endowments of the two economies, but
is the same for dierent equilibria corresponding to dierent asset-purchase policies
!: Hence utility comparisons between the equilibria associated with dierent asset-
purchase policies are the same for both economies.
Proof. Preferences of the form (4.1) have the property that each household's utility
uh(xh) is equal to an expression of the form u^h(x^h) plus a constant which depends
only on the aggregate endowment pattern. Hence the household's decisions can be
modeled as maximizing u^h; and we can reformulate the household's decision problem
in terms of its choice of a relative consumption plan x^h; without having to specify
the implied absolute consumption levels.
As above, the homotheticity of preferences implies that each household must
choose to consume goods 1 and 3 in any state in the ratio of the aggregate endow-
ments of those goods in that state, so that we can further reduce a household's choice
of a relative consumption plan to its choice of an intertemporal relative expenditure
plan (c^h; c^h1 ; c^
h


































in each state, as a consequence of (2.9).
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The household decision problem can then be expressed as the choice of a plan






2 ) to maximize












2  e^h + a^1f^h1 + a^2f^h2 ;
c^hs  g^hs + y^hs ; for s = 1; 2;





y^h2   h^(a^)!   shm;
where
^(a^)  (  1)a^1
2a^1 + 2a^2
;

































(Here we have repeatedly used (4.2) to simplify the expression of the constraints.)
An equilibrium can then be dened as a collection of normalized household plans
and normalized state prices a^s such that each household's normalized plan solves the






Since both the household problems and the market-clearing conditions can be written
entirely in terms of the normalized household plans, the normalized state prices, the
share parameters, the price ratio , and the policy parameter !; it follows that if
economies E and E 0 have the same share parameters and the same value for  and
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!, the possible equilibria must also be identical, to the extent that those equilibria
are described in terms of the normalized household plans and the normalized state
prices.
Moreover, (2.10) implies that




so m^ will be the same in corresponding equilibria of the two economies as well. This
implies that the percentage change in p1 (and in aggregate nominal expenditure in






h) caused by a given change in ! will be
the same for both economies. Similarly, (2.11) implies that














so that p^3 will be the same in corresponding equilibria of the two economies as well.
This implies that the percentage change in both p3 and in p3=p1 caused by a given
change in ! will be the same for both economies.
Finally, each household's utility is given by the quantity u^h (which depends only on
its normalized expenditure plan), plus a constant that depends only on the economy's
aggregate endowment of the various goods in the various states. So the increase in
u^h in moving from one equilibrium to another is equal to the increase in uh. Thus
our conclusions about the eects of asset-purchase policies on the welfare of each
household type will also be the same for economies E and E 0: 
Hence the alternative numerical values that need to be considered, if we assume
preferences of the form (4.1) and only two household types, as in the examples con-











and :45 If (as here) we restrict attention to economies in which money endowments
are small, we need only consider alternative points in a ve-dimensional space.
In the examples below, we give particular attention to the consequences of varia-
tion in the values of s111 and s
1
21; indicating the relative endowments of the non-durable
good in each of the two possible states in period 1, holding xed the household's
period-0 endowments. Variation in these parameters allows us to show how the way
45Note that in the case of parameters indicating tax shares and endowment shares, a specication
of household 1's share implies a value for household 2's share as well, as the shares must sum to 1.
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in which the collateral constraints bind depends on the nature and degree of the het-
erogeneity in the hedging demands of the two household types, owing to dierences
in their state-contingent period-1 income unrelated to their portfolio choices. We use
the algorithm described in Schommer (2013) to numerically solve for the collateral-
constrained equilibrium associated with each possible parameter conguration.
In each of several gures, we consider how the character of equilibrium changes
as s111 varies between 0 and 1 (on the horizontal axis) and s
1
21 varies between 0 and
1 (on the vertical axis). We use the following shorthand to report the way in which
the collateral constraints bind in a given equilibrium. \SCh" means that the short-
sale constraint (2.21) binds for household h, while \LCh means that the leverage
constraint (2.22) binds for household h. Thus the notation \LC1; SC2" means that
the leverage constraint of household 1 binds and that the short-sale constraint of
household 2 binds, in the same equilibrium. We use the notation \AD" (since the
equilibrium of our model coincides with the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in this case)
if neither constraint binds for any household.
Several gures also report, for the same range of variation in the period-1 endow-
ment patters, the signs of the derivatives with respect to ! of the expected utilities
of each of the two household types, evaluated at the particular value of ! for which
the gure is drawn. Plus and minus signs are used to indicate these signs: thus \+
+" means that the welfare of both types increases when ! is increased by a small
enough amount (the case shown in Figure 4 above), \+ -" means that the welfare of
household 1 increases while that of household 2 decreases (the case shown in Figure 3
above), and so on. In the case of an A-D equilibrium, to which Proposition 2 applies,
we write \00" to indicate that both derivatives are zero.46
4.2 Example 1: Symmetric Initial-Period Endowments
In this example, we assume that both households have equal endowments of both the
non-durable and durable goods in period 0 (shl = 0:5; for h = 1; 2 and l = 1; 3), and
that tax shares are equal as well (h = 0:5 for h = 1; 2). Money endowments are also
46There are never open regions of parameter space over which either derivative is exactly zero,































Figure 5: Example 1 with ! = 0: (a) regions where collateral constraints bind; (b)
welfare eects of a small increase in !:
assumed to be equal, and of negligible magnitude.47 We assume that the aggregate
non-durable good endowment in state 1 is 15/7 times the aggregate endowment of
the durable good, while in state 2 it is only 6/7 times the durable endowment; (4.2)
then implies that p12=p11 = 15=7 in state 1, while p22=p21 = 6=7 in state 2. We
also assume a period 1 monetary policy commitment to achieve the same ination
rate regardless of the state, so that p11 = p21; hence  = 5=2 in this example. Thus
the nominal value of the durable in state 2 is only 40 percent of its value in state
1.48 The collateral requirement for debt that defaults in state 2 but not in state 1 is
47In the numerical results reported, we assume that mh = 0:0005 for h = 1; 2; that i = 0:1; that
p11 = p21 = 1; and that the aggregate non-durable endowment in state 2 is 6; so that s
h
m = 0:000046
for h = 1; 2:
48Note that only the implied value of  matters for our conclusions below, and not our specic
assumptions about aggregate endowments or monetary policy individually, as a consequence of
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accordingly C1 = 7=15; while the collateral requirement for riskless debt is C2 = 7=6:
We rst consider the kind of equilibrium that results in this case when ! = 0
(the central bank holds none of the durable asset), for alternative assumptions about
the households' relative shares of the period 1 non-durable endowment. Panel (a)
of Figure 5 shows which collateral constraints bind in equilibrium, for alternative
possible values of s111 and s
1
21:
49 As required by Proposition 3, in the symmetric case
(s1s1 = 0:5 for s = 1; 2), no collateral constraints bind, and we eectively have an A-D
equilibrium. The gure shows that this continues to be true for specications which
are not perfectly symmetrical, but in which the endowment patterns of the two types
are suciently similar. In particular, as long as the non-durable endowment shares
are suciently similar in the two states that are possible in period 1, we have an A-D
equilibrium, regardless of whether one household has a larger share of the period 1
endowment in both states.
The fact that the two households may have dierent motives to save (because
one has more income in period 1 than in period 0, while the other has less) is not
in itself a reason for any household's collateral constraint to bind. As long as each
household's relative endowments in the two states is similar to the relative aggregate
endowment in these states (that is, a non-durable endowment in state 2 that is
about 40 percent of the size of the household's state 1 endowment), then households'
desired intertemporal trade can largely occur simply by adjusting their holdings of the
durable; and even if one household holds all of the period-1 non-durable endowment
in both states (and therefore has the strongest possible motive to borrow), it can
equalize its consumption share over time (consuming 5/8 of the aggregate supply of
both goods in each state at each date) by selling half of its initial durable endowment
in period 0, and thus entering period 1 (in either state) owning all of the non-durable
endowment but only 1/4 of the aggregate supply of durables (worth 5/8 of the total
supply of non-durable and durable goods, in either state). Thus for all points close
enough to the diagonal in Figure 5(a), even the household with the smaller period-1
endowments continues to hold some of the durable and issues little debt, so that its
collateral constraint does not bind.
If, instead, the non-durable endowment shares are suciently dierent in the two
Lemma 5.
49Here and in all of the numerical examples discussed below, there is a unique equilibrium for
each endowment pattern and policy considered.
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possible states in period 1, one household's collateral constraint will bind, while the
other remains unconstrained. The constrained household is the one that has a large
share of the non-durable endowment in state 1, but a small share in state 2 (household
1 in the lower right region of the gure, household 2 in the upper left region); and
the constraint that binds is the short-sale constraint (2.21). Thus in equilibria in the
lower right region (labeled \SC1"), household 1 is constrained in the way shown in
Figure 2(b). Because household 1 has a larger endowment share in state 1, it would
prefer a portfolio that paid o more in state 2 than in state 1; but this would require
it to take a short position in the durable (that is worth more in state 1 than in state





























Figure 6: Example 1 with ! = 0:5: (a) regions where collateral constraints bind; (b)
welfare eects of a small increase in !:
We turn to the question of how welfare is aected by small asset purchases by the
central bank (a small increase in !). Panel (b) of Figure 5 indicates for each of the
cases the sign of the derivative of the utility level of each of the household types with
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respect to !: In the case of economies in the diagonal region (labeled \AD") in panel
(a), (suciently small) asset purchases have no eect on the equilibrium allocation
of resources, by Proposition 2; hence there is no eect on welfare, and this region
is labeled \00" in panel (b). When the relative endowments of the two types are
suciently dierent in the two states, instead, asset purchases tighten the collateral
constraint of the constrained household type, as shown in Figure 2(b).
The partial-equilibrium eect shown in that gure, however, does not suce to
sign the welfare eects. In order for markets to clear, the price of the durable rises,
and this results in a positive income eect for the constrained household (a net seller
of durables, since its short-sale constraint binds), and a negative one for the uncon-
strained household (that must be a net buyer). When the collateral constraint does
not bind too tightly (so that the welfare eects of a small further tightening of the
constraint are modest), this is the dominant eect, and the welfare of the constrained
household is improved by central-bank purchases of the durable, while the welfare of
the unconstrained household is reduced. Thus in Figure 5(b), the region just below
and to the right of the diagonal region is labeled \+ -", indicating that the utility of
household 1 increases while that of household 2 decreases.
In the case of an even more asymmetric endowment pattern, however, the dis-
tortion associated with the constrained household's binding collateral constraint is
larger, and the consequences for welfare of further tightening of the constraint (shown
in Figure 2(b) if one neglects the eects of price changes) are more substantial. For a
suciently asymmetric endowment pattern, this becomes the dominant eect on the
welfare of the constrained household; in such cases (indicated by the upper left corner
and lower right corner of Figure 5(b)), the welfare of both household types is reduced
by central-bank asset purchases. Such a policy change would thus be unambiguously
undesirable.
In Figure 6, we instead assume an initial level of central-bank holdings of the
durable of ! = 0:5; and consider the eects of small additional asset purchases be-
yond that level. Figure 6 has the same format as Figure 5. In panel (a), we again
observe that no collateral constraints bind for endowment patterns along the diago-
nal; but now the region labeled \AD" is a narrower strip around the diagonal. As
the central bank purchases a larger share of the aggregate supply of the durable,
the restrictions required in order for the collateral constraints not to bind become
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Figure 7: Example 1 with ! = 0:98: (a) regions where collateral constraints bind; (b)
welfare eects of a small increase in !:
almost all possible endowment patterns, the collateral constraint eventually binds
for one of the households, if ! is made large enough. Again, in this example, it is
always the short-sale constraint rather than the leverage constraint that binds; and
the welfare eects in the case of endowment patterns far enough from the diagonal
are qualitatively the same as in the ! = 0 case. However, when ! is larger, the degree
of asymmetry in the period-1 non-durable endowments required in order for further
asset purchases to reduce the welfare of both households is less extreme, as shown in
panel (b) of this gure.
Figure 7 shows how the results change if the central bank's share of the durable is
increased still further. Further increases in ! continue to shrink the range of period-
1 endowment patterns for which neither household's short-sale constraint binds; as
shown in panel (a), by the time ! = 0:98; both households' short-sale constraints
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fail to bind only in the case of endowments in a very narrow diagonal strip.50 The
regions near the \AD" region in which the short-sale constraint binds to such a
mild extent that the household with the binding constraint benets from additional
asset purchases, despite the fact that such purchases tighten its short-sale constraint
(e.g., the region below the diagonal region \00" in panel (b), labeled \+ -"), also
become very narrow strips. In most of the plane, the welfare of the household with
the binding short-sale constraint is reduced by further central-bank asset purchases.
However, in the case of large enough values of !; it is no longer always the case
that the unconstrained household is harmed. As shown in panel (b) of this gure
for the case ! = 0:98; if the unconstrained household has a suciently large share of
the aggregate endowment, then its welfare is increased by additional asset purchases,
though the constrained household is harmed.
The eects of central-bank purchases over the entire range of possible values of
! are shown for an illustrative example in Figure 8. In the case considered here,
type 1 households own all of the non-durable goods endowment in state 1, while
type 2 households own the entire endowment in state 2. (This endowment pattern
corresponds to the point in the lower right corner of the panels in Figures 5 through 7.)
These endowments are suciently asymmetric for household 1's short-sale constraint
to bind, regardless of the value of !: In this case, further central-bank purchases of the
durable progressively reduce aggregate nominal spending, as shown by the monotonic
decline in p1 in panel (a). Nonetheless, the price p3 of the durable is increased, until
central-bank holdings of the durable reach nearly 60 percent of the total supply.51
Thus the mere fact that asset purchases raise the price of the asset is not sucient
to imply that such purchases increase aggregate demand.
Nor does it suce for one to conclude that welfare is increased. As shown in
panel (b) of Figure 8, the welfare of household 1 is monotonically decreasing in ! in
50The \AD" region no longer includes the entire diagonal, but is instead a narrow strip somewhat
steeper than the diagonal, because in our numerical example households do have positive (though
small) initial endowments of money, and these are important for the location of the boundaries of
the \AD" region for values of ! close enough to 1.
51In panel (a) of this gure, as in Figure 12(a) below, what is plotted is not the prices themselves,
but the amount by which the log price changes relative to its equilibrium value when ! = 0: Thus,


















































Figure 8: Eects of variation in ! over its entire feasible range, for Example 1 when
s111 = 1; s
1
21 = 0: (a) eects on prices; (b) welfare consequences.
this example, over the entire feasible range of values.52 The welfare of household 2
is also decreasing as ! increases, until the central bank already holds more than 80
percent of the total supply, though for very high values of !; further asset purchases
raise these households' level of expected utility somewhat.53 Thus everyone's welfare
is reduced, in all of the cases in which the policy raises the price of the durable; at
the same time, at least some can benet, when the policy reduces the asset price to a
52In panel (b) of this gure, as in Figure 12(b) below, what is plotted is not the absolute value of
Uh for each household, but rather the amount by which Uh diers from the level of expected utility
when ! = 0: Thus the fact that the \household 2" curve is above the \household 1" curve in the
gure does not mean that household 2 has a higher level of expected utility, but that its utility has
been decreased by less as a result of the central-bank purchases. In fact, household 1 has the higher
level of expected utility, for all of the cases shown in this gure.
53This last observation is consistent with the fact that this point belongs to the region labeled





























Figure 9: Example 2 with ! = 0: (a) regions where collateral constraints bind; (b)
welfare eects of a small increase in !:
sucient extent. Even in this last case, however, the reduction in the welfare of type
1 as ! increases is greater than the increase in the welfare of type 2; and the equilibria
with very high values of ! are in any event Pareto dominated by those with low values
of ! (even if they are not Pareto dominated by the equilibria associated with only
slightly lower values of !). Hence in this example, central-bank asset purchases are
clearly undesirable.
4.3 Example 2: Leverage-Constrained Investors
We now illustrate how a greater degree of asymmetry in the situations of the two
household types can make possible equilibria in which the \natural buyers" of the
risky asset are constrained (by the collateral requirement) in their ability to make
as large a leveraged position in this asset as they would otherwise wish. Aggregate
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endowments (and hence the value of ) are the same as in Example 1, and we again
assume that sh1 = 0:5 for h = 1; 2; but now we assume that only households of
type 2 are initially endowed with the durable good (s13 = 0). We also now assume
asymmetric tax shares: 1 = 0:9; 2 = 0:1: (The larger tax share for type 1 in
this example amplies the eects of central-bank asset purchases on the collateral
constraints of this type; recall that the shifts in the feasible regions shown in Figure
2 are proportional to h.) We continue to assume that money endowments are very
small.54
We again plot numerical results for alternative values of s111; s
1
21 in the plane.
Figure 9 is for the case in which the central bank holds none of the durable asset.
Along the diagonal in panel (a), we again have economies in which period-1 non-
durable endowments are the same for the two households, and hence in which every
household's endowment income in state 1 relative to that in state 2 is in the same
ratio as the relative payo of the durable asset in the two states. It thus again follows
(in the limiting case of zero money endowments) that the A-D allocation could be
supported purely through trade in the durable. The dierence is that now households
of type 1 have no initial endowment of the durable, so that the required trade might
involve a short sale of the durable by these households (which is not allowed by the
collateral constraint). This is in fact the case if households of type 1 have a large
enough share of the period-1 endowment income, so that they wish to borrow against
their period-1 income in order to smooth their consumption level over time. Thus in
Figure 9(a), the \AD" region no longer includes all of the diagonal. For points near
the diagonal with s111; s
1
21 < 1=2; the A-D allocation can be supported with positive
holdings of the durable by both types (and net positions near zero in the riskless
asset for both); but for points near the diagonal with s111; s
1
21 > 1=2; we instead have
an equilibrium in which both constraints (2.21){(2.22) bind for type 1. This means
that type 1 households choose to be at the corner of the grey region in Figure 1(a),
corresponding to a zero position in both the durable and the riskless asset.
Figure 9(a) also diers from Figure 5(a) in that in the region above the \AD"
region, we now have equilibria in which constraint (2.22) binds for households of type
54The aggregate money endowment is again of the same size as in Example 1. But as in that exam-
ple, we assume that initial money endowments are distributed between the two types in proportion
to their tax shares, so that now m1 = 0:0009;m2 = 0:0001:
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1.55 In these cases, households of type 1 have a substantial period-1 endowment in
state 2, but not in state 1. This makes households of type 1 the \natural buyers"
of the durable, as the durable (which is worth more in state 1 than in state 2)
allows them to hedge their endowment risk, whereas the opposite is true for type 2
(who need to reduce their holdings of the durable in order to hedge their endowment
risk). In Example 1, this kind of asymmetry, if pronounced enough, resulted in an
equilibrium in which the short-sale constraint bound for households of type 2. But
now, with the durable asset initially held entirely by type 2, there is never a problem
of household 2 wishing to take a short position in that asset. Instead, the constraint
that prevents implementation of the A-D allocation is the leverage constraint of type
1: because households of type 1 initially own none of the durable (and do not have a
large period-0 endowment of the non-durable good with which to purchase it, either),
they need to borrow in order to acquire enough of the durable good for ecient risk-
sharing with households of type 2. When the asymmetry of the period-1 endowments
is severe enough, the required degree of leverage is no longer compatible with the
collateral constraint. We thus obtain the possibility of an equilibrium in which the
\natural buyers" of the risky asset are constrained in their ability to further leverage
themselves in order to purchase as much of it as they would like. If in addition, as
assumed here, h is large for these investors, central-bank purchases of the durable
will relax this leverage constraint to a signicant extent.
As discussed in section 3, the observation that household 1's leverage constraint
is relaxed does not suce to determine the welfare eects of central-bank asset pur-
chases. In the region where only household 1's leverage constraint binds, if the con-
straint does not bind too tightly (that is, at points near the boundary of the \AD"
region), asset purchases reduce the welfare of household 1, while increasing the welfare
of household 2, as in Figure 3 (but with the roles of the households reversed). Hence
this region is labeled \-+" in Figure 9(b). For endowment patterns for which the
constraint binds more tightly (points farther in the upper left corner of the gure),
the welfare of both households is increased, as in Figure 4 (the region labeled \++"
in Figure 9(b)). In this case, central-bank asset purchases are Pareto-improving.56
In the region where both the short-sale constraint and the leverage constraint
55The existence of an \SC1" region to the right of the \AD" region occurs for the same reason
as in Example 1, and so requires no further discussion.
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Figure 10: Example 2 with ! = 0:5: (a) regions where collateral constraints bind; (b)
welfare eects of a small increase in !:
bind for household 1 (that is, household 1 is at the corner of the set of feasible
intertemporal transfers shown in Figure 1(a)), central-bank asset purchases relax the
leverage constraint, but also tighten the household's short-sale constraint. Which
of these eects is more important for the welfare of household 1 depends on which
constraint binds more tightly. In the upper-left part of this region (the part closer
to the region where only the leverage constraint binds), the most important eect
is the relaxation of the leverage constraint, and a Pareto improvement results; but
in the lower-right part of the region (the part closer to the region where only the
short-sale constraint binds), the most important eect is the tightening of household
1's short-sale constraint, and the welfare of household 1 is reduced, though household
2 benets from central-bank asset purchases.
Figure 10 shows how these gures change if instead we consider a situation in




































Figure 11: Example 2 with ! = 0:98: (a) regions where collateral constraints bind;
(b) welfare eects of a small increase in !:
are qualitatively the same, but now the location of both the region in which the A-
D allocation is achieved and the region in which a Pareto improvement occurs (the
region \+ +" in panel (b) of the gure) are shifted up and to the left. The central
bank's policy increases the tax liability of household 1 in state 2 (the state in which
the central bank suers losses on the risky assets that it has acquired), while reducing
it in state 1; this requires a more extreme asymmetry of the period-1 endowments
in order for household 1 to be leverage-constrained, so that the region in which this
occurs shifts up and to the left. Consequently, both the region in which asset-purchase
policy is neutral and the region in which it is Pareto-improving are smaller parts of
the plane in Figure 10(b) than in Figure 9(b).
If central-bank purchases are even larger, the picture changes even further, as
illustrated by Figure 11 for the case ! = 0:98: For large enough values of !; it becomes
possible for the short-sale constraint to bind for household 2 as well. In fact, for
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values of ! near enough to 1, the short-sale constraint binds for one household or the
other, except in the case of fairly special endowment patterns (the two narrow slivers
labeled \AD" and \LC1" in Figure 11(a)). The conditions under which central-bank
purchases of the durable are Pareto-improving become progressively more special as !
increases, and eventually this ceases to be possible for any endowment patterns of the
kind considered in this example. For high enough values of !; under any endowment
patterns other than the fairly special ones for which the A-D allocation continues to
be achieved, further asset purchases always lower the welfare of households of type 1
(who largely bear the scal costs of the central bank's balance-sheet losses in state
2, and do not enjoy any income eect of increases in the market value of an initial
















































Figure 12: Eects of variation in ! over its entire feasible range, for Example 2 with
s111 = 0; s
1
21 = 0:5: (a) eects on prices; (b) welfare consequences.
This is illustrated for a particular endowment pattern in Figure 12, which shows
the eects of varying ! over its entire feasible range. In period 1, household 1 is
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assumed to have no endowment of the non-durable good in state 1, while the non-
durable endowment is equal for the two households in state 2. This asymmetric en-
dowment pattern makes household 1 the \natural buyer" of the good. It corresponds
to a point in the middle of the vertical axis on Figures 9 and 10.
As indicated in Figure 9(a), for low values of !; the leverage constraint binds for
household 1, and no other nancial constraints bind. Then Proposition 5) implies
that p1 and p3 both increase with !; though the relative price p3=p1 falls, as shown
in Figure 12(a) by the fact that ln p3 increases less steeply than does ln p1. This
continues to be the case as long as the central bank owns less than 32 percent of the
total supply of the durable.
Initially (until the central bank owns about 28 percent of the durables), the lever-
age constraint of household 1 binds to a sucient extent for the welfare of both types
to be increased by a modest increase in central-bank holdings of the durable, as indi-
cated in Figure 9(b). (The eects of asset purchases are those shown in Figure 4, but
with the roles of the two households reversed.) But as the leverage constraint of house-
hold 1 is relaxed to a sucient extent (and the A-D allocation is approached), the
adverse income eect of the relative-price change dominates the benet to household
1 of relaxation of the constraint. The expected utility of household 1 then decreases
with additional central-bank purchases, though the expected utility of household 2
continues to rise, in accordance with Proposition 6.
Once the central bank owns more than 32 percent of the durable, neither house-
hold's leverage constraint binds any longer, and the A-D allocation results.57 In this
case, neither prices nor the allocation of resources are aected by further central-bank
purchases (up until the bank owns 79 percent of the total supply), in accordance with
Proposition 2, resulting in at regions of the plots in both panels of Figure 12.58
But if the central bank continues to increase its share beyond 79 percent, the
collateral constraint of household 1 binds again | but now in the way shown in
Figure 2(b); that is, it is the short-sale constraint (2.21) that now binds. Because of
the central bank's losses on its large holdings of the durable in state 2, tax obligations
are substantially higher in state 2 than in state 1; and because of the eects of this
on after-tax income, household 1 eventually no longer wishes to hold the durable as a
hedge, and instead would prefer to short the durable (or issue debt on which it could
57See, for example, Figure 10(a) for the case ! = 0:5:
58See Figure 10(b) for the welfare derivatives when ! = 0:5:
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default in state 2), if the collateral constraint did not prevent this.59
In the numerical example, the short-sale constraint eventually binds for household
1 rather than household 2, because of the assumed distribution of tax obligations:
households of type 1 are assumed to pay 90 percent of the taxes, and therefore are
more strongly aected by the central bank's balance-sheet risk. While the equilibrium
allocation of resources does not change as ! increases from 32 percent to 79 percent,
household 1's holdings of the durable steadily decline, as the amount of this asset
needed to achieve its desired balance of after-tax income between states 1 and 2 falls,
reaching zero as ! reaches 79 percent.
Beyond this point, further central-bank purchases cause household 1's short-sale
constraint to bind ever more tightly. As in the example shown in Figure 8, central-
bank asset purchases reduce aggregate demand (and hence the equilibrium price level
p1) in this case, even though they succeed in increasing the price of the durable p3, as
shown in Figure 12(a). Moreover, the welfare of household 1 is reduced by the tighter
nancial constraint, as seen in Figure 12(b).60 Household 2 continues to benet
from the higher relative price of the durable, as household 2 sells all of the durables
purchased by the central bank; but household 1's budget suers, as household 1 bears
a disproportionate share of the burden of paying for the central bank's losses on the
transactions that have been so protable for household 2.61 Household 1's losses are
a consequence of two factors: the income redistribution to household 2, but also the
progressive reduction in risk-sharing between the two households, as household 1 is
forced to accept an after-tax income pattern that is skewed further toward greater
income in state 1 (the state in which the central bank's risky assets pay o well) than
is that of household 2. Though in this example household 2 continues to benet from
additional central-bank purchases, even when ! is already large, household 1 suers
a substantial welfare loss.
Thus even in the case of an endowment pattern for which central-bank asset
purchases of a modest size are clearly benecial | because (when ! is small) the
\natural buyers" of the risky asset are constrained in the degree to which they can
lever themselves to buy more of the asset, and thereby achieve more ecient risk-
59See Figure 11(a): the equilibrium corresponding to this numerical example lies in the region
labeled \SC1," that extends beyond the bottom of the gure.
60The format for this gure is the same as in the case of Figure 8, explained above.
61Note that these conclusions are consistent with the signs of the welfare derivatives at ! = 0:98;
shown in Figure 11(b).
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sharing; and asset purchases by the central bank are eectively a way of allowing
further intermediation, and hence a greater degree of risk-sharing, to occur | it
remains the case that too large a quantity of asset purchases by the central bank will
be harmful. In fact, in the example shown in Figure 12, it is the \natural buyers" of
the risky asset who are eventually harmed | to such an extent that their welfare is
lower for high values of ! than if there had been no asset purchases by the central
bank at all.
5 Conclusions
We have considered the consequences of central-bank purchases of a risky asset, which
is also the asset used as collateral for private debt contracts, in a general-equilibrium
asset pricing model with endogenous collateral constraints. We have shown that it is
possible for purchases of such an asset by the central bank to increase its equilibrium
price, as has been the intention of recent central-bank asset-purchase programs. Yet
as elementary as such a conclusion might seem, we have found that it will not obtain
under all circumstances. In our model, if there exists a sucient level of collateral
for no household's collateral constraint to bind in equilibrium, central-bank asset
purchases will have no eect on equilibrium asset prices, as the scal consequences of
the changes in the central bank's state-contingent revenues provide households with
a hedging motive to adjust their portfolios in ways that, in aggregate, will perfectly
oset the trades by the central bank.62 Moreover, even when this is not true, owing
to a greater degree of heterogeneity in the situations of dierent households, the mere
fact that collateral constraints bind and that central-bank purchases alter nancial
conditions does not imply that the price of the asset purchased by the central bank
will necessarily increase. It is possible, instead, for it to decrease.63 And even when
purchases increase the nominal price of the asset (p3), they do not necessarily increase
its real price (p3=p1).
64 To the extent that the goal of policy is to lower real yields on
assets in order to encourage borrowing and discourage saving, asset purchases fail to
62See Proposition 2 above.
63See, for example, the case in which the central bank owns more than 60 percent of the total
supply of the asset, in Figure 8(a) above.
64See, for example, Proposition 5, and the case illustrated in Figure 12(a), when the central bank
owns less than 32 percent of the total supply.
82
achieve the desired goal in the latter case, even though collateral constraints bind.
We have also shown that the eects of asset purchases are not equivalent to those
of adjusting the central bank's nominal interest-rate target by a certain amount.
This means that the mere fact that a central bank is prevented from lowering the
nominal interest rate as much as it would wish to, owing to the zero lower bound,
does not suce to imply that asset purchases are desirable. On the other hand, the
non-equivalence of these two types of policies also means that the mere fact that
interest-rate policy is available (because the lower bound has not been reached) does
not necessarily imply that there is no reason to consider asset purchases. In principle,
multiple objectives can be more fully achieved when multiple (non-equivalent) policy
instruments are available. In particular, asset-purchase policies may be of interest
because they can aect the size of distortions associated with nancial constraints,
and hence the eciency of risk sharing, in addition to their consequences for aggre-
gate demand. When a central bank is free to adjust policy along both dimensions
independently, it may make sense to use unconventional policy mainly to inuence
the allocation of risk, while the consequences of the central bank's asset purchases
for aggregate demand are oset by a suitable adjustment of the interest-rate target.
However, it is important to note that the eects of unconventional policy on the
market price of the asset acquired by the central bank is not sucient information
from which to draw a conclusion as to whether the policy will be successful at \easing
nancial conditions," increasing aggregate demand, or preventing unwanted disina-
tion or deation. When collateral constraints bind, one cannot say in general whether
purchases of the risky asset by the central bank will loosen households' borrowing
constraints, or instead tighten them. This depends on whether the constraints bind
in the way shown in Figure 2(a) or in the way shown in Figure 2(b).65 It follows
that even when asset purchases increase the real price of the asset, one cannot con-
clude that the corresponding intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) is
reduced for everyone in the economy; for if the increase in the real price of the asset
is associated with a tightening of the short-sale constraints of some households (as in
the example shown in Figure 8 for values of ! less than 0.7, or the example shown in
Figure 12 for values of ! greater than 0.8), then the wedge between these households'
IMRS and the reciprocal of the asset price increases, so that an increase in the asset
65Of course, it is possible for constraints of both types to bind in a given equilibrium, as some of
our numerical examples illustrate.
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price need not imply a decrease in every household's IMRS.
We have also shown that asset purchases do not necessarily raise p1; the general
price level in period 0,66 even when they increase the real price of the durable.67 This
means that when the central bank is unable to use conventional interest-rate policy to
prevent deation, or unwanted disination, due to the zero lower bound on i, a resort
to asset purchases will not necessarily be of any help | these may lower the equilib-
rium price level still further.68 In such a case, central-bank asset purchases also lower
aggregate nominal expenditure (on goods and services, as opposed to assets) in period
0 | the \aggregate demand" that interest-rate cuts are intended to increase. Because
we assume an endowment economy, a reduction in nominal aggregate demand has no
consequences for the aggregate quantity of goods that are produced and consumed;
but in an extension of the model with an endogenous supply of goods in period 0 and
sticky wages or prices, the reduction of nominal aggregate demand can translate into
reduced output | again, the opposite of what a cut in the nominal interest rate (if
one is possible) would achieve.69 This it is not always even approximately correct to
view asset purchases as a substitute for an interest-rate cut, that can be used even
when an interest-rate cut is precluded by the zero lower bound. Moreover, while the
conditions that determine which types of eects asset purchases will have are com-
plex, our numerical examples suggest that asset purchases typically reduce aggregate
demand (and lower the price level) when some households are short-sale constrained,
and none are leverage-constrained | and this case is quite likely to arise once the
central bank owns a suciently large share of the total supply of the asset.
These conclusions make the welfare consequences of central-bank asset purchases
complex to assess. In our exible-price model, there are no eects of monetary policy
(whether conventional or unconventional) on output, nor are there any consequences
of changes in the general price level for household utility. Hence our analysis of the
66Recall that under our assumption of homothetic preferences, p1 and p2 must change in the same
proportion, so that the change in log p1 is also the change in the log of an index of the prices of
both non-durable goods and the services received from durable goods, i.e., the entire household
consumption basket in period 0.
67See Figure 8, and Figure 12 for the case of ! greater than 0.8.
68Of course, if there is sucient collateral for households' constraints not to bind, asset purchases
have no eect on the price level of either sign | just as they have no eect on other asset prices, or
on the equilibrium allocation of resources.
69We leave the analysis of this extended model for a separate paper.
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consequences of policy for household utility takes account only of the consequences of
policy for the eciency of the equilibrium consumption allocation, owing to changes in
the size of the nancial wedges that separate the IMRS of dierently situated house-
holds, and for the redistributions of income among households that may result from
changes in equilibrium asset prices. We have seen that nancial constraints may be
either tightened or loosened by central-bank asset purchases, depending on the way in
which households are constrained. If households are prevented from issuing as much
riskless debt as they would like, central-bank asset purchases relax this constraint
and hence reduce the associated distortion (Figure 2(a)); but if instead households
are preventing from shorting the risky asset, central-bank purchases tighten this con-
straint and increase the associated distortion (Figure 2(b)). In the former case, at
least one type of household benets from the more ecient allocation of resources,
but some may be hurt, owing to the redistributive eects of price changes (Figure 3);
only under certain more special circumstances will the purchases result in a Pareto
improvement (Figure 4). When short-sale constraints bind, the welfare of at least
some households must be reduced by the increase in nancial distortions as a result
of central-bank purchases; and while at least some households may benet from the
associated price changes (the \+ -" and \- +" regions in Figure 5(b)), in some cases
the welfare of all households will be reduced (the \- -" regions in that same gure).
These conclusions about welfare do not take account of any desire on the part
of the central bank to inuence aggregate spending or the general level of prices. If
interest-rate policy can be used to oset the policy's eects on aggregate demand,
these may not be the consequences of interest in any event (except in order to de-
termine how interest-rate policy must be adjusted in light of the asset purchases).
But when interest-rate policy is constrained by the zero lower bound, this argument
will not apply; and in fact, the unconventional policies undertaken by central banks
recently have primarily been motivated the hope that these policies can increase
aggregate demand and prevent unwanted disination or deation. In order to ana-
lyze the desirability of unconventional policy under such circumstances, we should
consider not only the eects of household purchases on the utilities of the various
households in our model, but also the eects of aggregate expenditure (or the general
price level, p1) in period 0. In the case that only leverage constraints bind (in our
two-household model), we have seen that asset purchases raise p1, which is a further
benet of the policy in this case. (In an extended model with nominal rigidities, the
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conditions required for a Pareto improvement are likely to be somewhat weaker than
in the analysis here, as all households could benet from higher utilization of pro-
ductive capacity in period 0.) But when (only) short-sale constraints bind instead,
our examples indicate that asset purchases reduce aggregate demand and the general
level of prices | which would be an additional negative eect of the policy, under
circumstances where aggregate demand is already insucient, owing to a binding
lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
It thus matters greatly, in judging the likely benets of central-bank asset pur-
chases, which sorts of nancial constraints bind, and to what extent. The mere fact
that aggregate demand is judged to be insucient in the absence of such purchases
(or given the quantity of purchases that have already been made) is not a sucient
ground for expecting additional purchases to have a desirable eect. First, the eects
of the purchases on the degree to which nancial constraints bind also matters for
welfare, apart from the consequences for aggregate demand; and second, the eects
of asset purchases on aggregate demand cannot be predicted, without taking into
account the way in which they will tighten or loosen the nancial constraints of dif-
ferently situated parties. Nor can these questions be answered simply by observing
whether central-bank purchases succeed in raising the market price of the assets pur-
chased; the price p3 of the asset purchased by the central bank may increase either in
a case in which nancial constraints are loosened and aggregate demand is increased
(Figure 12(a) when ! < 0:32), or in a case in which nancial constraints are tightened
and aggregate demand is reduced (Figure 8(a) when ! < 0:59; or Figure 12(a) when
! > 0:79). Thus our analysis suggests that such policies should be undertaken only
on the basis of a careful analysis of the consequences of the policies for the allocation
of risk through the nancial system, and not simply on the basis of an assessment
of the current output or unemployment gap and of the degree to which central-bank
purchases seem to aect market prices.
While our model's general implications for the eects of asset purchases on nan-
cial constraints are dicult to summarize, one fairly simple conclusion is worth noting.
Regardless of whether asset purchases on a modest scale relax nancial constraints
or tighten them, or model implies that continued asset purchases by the central bank
will eventually result in a situation where many households are constrained in their
ability to short the asset acquired by the central bank. Once a sucient fraction of the
total supply of the asset is held by the central bank, it becomes almost inevitable that
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the primary eect of further purchases will be to tighten nancial constraints, rather
than to loosen them, and to contract aggregate demand, rather than to increase it.
Thus even under circumstances where asset purchases on a suciently modest scale
are clearly benecial (as in the numerical example considered in Figure 12), at some
point further asset purchases of the same kind become counter-productive from both
microeconomic (ecient risk-sharing) and macroeconomic (aggregate-demand man-
agement) perspectives. Central banks would thus do well to avoid the trap of thinking
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